The Concept of Mandatory Jurisdiction by Fischer, James M.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Volume 41, Number 4, 1980
The Concept of Mandatory Jurisdiction
JAMES M. FISCHER*
It is the responsibility of all courts to see that no unauthorized extension or
reduction of jurisdiction, direct or indirect, occurs in the federal system.,
INTRODUCTION
The legal doctrine examined in this Article is that of "mandatory"
jurisdiction-the notion that courts must exercise a valid investment of
judicial authority over all cases that come within the terms of the jurisdic-
tional grant of power. The concept of mandatory jurisdiction has often
been invoked by courts when it suits their interests, and for the same reason
is often ignored. When the doctrine of mandatory jurisdiction has not been
applied, however, courts invariably have taken care to disclaim any notion
that the concept was not being followed. This degree of care is understan-
dable for the concept of mandatory jurisdiction lies at the very root of
constitutional government as fashioned by the judiciary in this country.
The notion that a federal court must exercise its jurisdiction in all
cases that are justiciable is found in Marbury v. Madison,2 and indeed rose
to ex cathedra proportions in Cohens v. Virginia,3 in which Chief Justice
Marshall asserted:
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is
equally true, that it must takejurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as
the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the
constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever
doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it,
if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or
the other would be treason to the constitution.
It is interesting that in articulating the doctrine of mandatory jurisdic-
tion, not only were Marshall's statements unsupported and his premises
unproved but the position asserted has remained virtually unchallenged
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1. Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955) (emphasis added).
2. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). A theory of discretionary power to decline to exercisejurisdic-
tion "is something that cannot exist within the four corners of Marbury v. Madison." Bickel, Fore-
word: The Passive Virtues, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40, 46 (1961).
3. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
4. Id. at 404.
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since its utterance. Perhaps Marshall thought the truth of the matter so
self-evident that an explanation of the obvious was unnecessary; and
perhaps this myth has prevented serious inquiry into the doctrine. Yet, the
proposition that courts may not decline to exercise jurisdiction validly
conferred is not self-evident. 6 Rather, if the doctrine of mandatory juris-
diction, or some variant thereof, is to be accepted as a component of
modern jurisprudence, it must be because the doctrine possesses utility,
that it somehow furthers by permissible means the ends and purposes for
which courts, as political institutions, have been created.7
In assessing the utility of the doctrine of mandatory jurisdiction, it is
beneficial to examine its historical origins. This benefit is not derived
because historical investigation provides the proper resolution of the
problem; rather, the use of history will aid in discerning why the doctrine of
mandatory jurisdiction has come to be "accepted" as an integral compo-
nent of common law jurisdiction. History has a part to play. It allows us to
gain some perspective and evaluate the soundness of continued adherence
to a doctrine, the origin of which has, to date, been unexplored. After the
historical origins of the doctrine, both in England and in the United States,
have been examined, the development of exceptions to the command of
mandatory jurisdiction will be inspected. Finally, the current utility of
adherence to the doctrine will be assessed in light of the purposes to which
the doctrine is put, and the demands of modern judicial institutions. The
conclusion offered is that although the doctrine of mandatory jurisdiction
may have some utility in upholding respect for courts as neutral decision-
makers, it is not an essential component8 of an adjudicatory system.
I. THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINE
OF MANDATORY JURISDICTION
A. The Concept of Mandatory Jurisdiction
under the Early Common Law
The status of the doctrine of mandatory jurisdiction at common law
5. See, e.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1959).
6. See, e.g., Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues: The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARv.
L. REV. 40 (1961).
7. Id. at 49, 50. It is interesting that the responses to Professor Bickers argument largely avoided
acknowledging the political role of the courts in modem society. See e.g., Gunther, The Subtle Vices of
the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUmM. L.
REV. 1, 10 (1964). This lack of acknowledgement necessarily resulted in different attitudes regarding
the propriety ofjudicial declinations ofjurisdiction. Different attitudes concerning utility would arise
anytime the object of inquiry was different for each inquirer. At the minimum, those who disagree with
Professor Bickel's observations are obliged to explain how they differ with his views regarding the
"politicar' role of the Court. If the Court's politics have come to equal or outweigh its traditionally
conceived judicial function, then our notions of what proper, utilitarian practices the Court may
engage in must necessarily be adjusted.
8. There are certain criteria that one intuitively demands of a system of adjudication, such as im-
partiality of decisionmakers, technical competence, judiciousness, and equality. These criteria would
be "essential" in any case, while others may be so considered on a nonintuitive basis.
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was not clear, although several decisions do rest in part upon such a
doctrinal formulation. At several points in his work, On the Laws and
Customs of England, Bracton described a judicial system that at least with
respect to access questions was, in theory, not based upon discretion. 9 In
describing an "action" that had to be pursued in a judicial proceeding,
Bracton described it as "the right of pursuing . . . what is due to one."
Bracton further noted that the king, from whom all civil judicial power
emanated, was "vicar of God on earth." Thus the king was obligated to
distinguish 'jus from injuria," "equity from inequity. ' '10 It was not a duty
that could be declined, inasmuch as the king had sworn a coronation oath
to provide justice and peace to his subjects." As the judges represented the
king, this obligation was in turn vested in the courts.1 2 Whatever the
practical reality of notions of mandatory jurisdiction in twelfth and thir-
teenth century England, there was a conceptual basis for ingraining into
the system a sense of obligation to decide cases properly brought before the
court,1 3 although one would be hard pressed to argue that functionally any
"right" to judicial proceedings existed.
With the separation of the courts from the king's household, a period
of uncertainty arose. The basis of the court's power or, more accurately,
the judges' perception of the basis of their right or power to adjudicate,
9. Bracton defined an "action" thus: "What is an action? It is nothing other than the right of
pursuing in ajudicial proceeding what is due to one." 2 BRACTON, BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS
OF ENGLAND 282 (S. Thorne trans. 1968). There is substantial doubt over the accuracy of ascribing the
work to Bracton. See Wiener, Did Bracton Write Bracton?, 64 A.B.A.J. 72 (1978). And perhaps even
greater dispute over the accuracy of certain passages as translated in the work. See Wiener, Bracton in
English After Seven Hundred Years, 55 A.B.AJ. 964 (1969). Nonetheless, the problems do not appear
to diminish the importance of the work as indicative of the existence of a perceived right to ajudicial
remedy no matter how circumscribed that right actually was in the formative period of the English
judicial system-the period that Bracton's work chronicles.
10. "The king, since he is the vicar of God on earth, must distinguishjus from injuria, equity from
inequity, that all his subjects may live uprightly, none injure another, and by a just award each be
restored to that which is his own." 2 BRACTON, BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CusTOMs OF ENGLAND 305
(S. Thorne trans. 1968).
11. Id. at 304.
12. See generally R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 11-14 (1963). See also 2 BRACTON,
BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 306-07 (S. Thorne trans. 1968).
13. The concept ofjurisdiction at common law is always difficult to discuss adequately because it
was a far larger issue than functionally defining the composition and competency of courts. As noted
by Pollock and Maitland:
Courts exist for the purpose of defining and enforcing the rules of substantive law. But when
we are dealing with the middle ages, we can not thus regard what we may call the "law of
jurisdiction" as merely subsidiary or "adjective." It is intertwined with the law of property and
the law of personal status and this in many different ways. In the first place, jurisdiction is a
proprietary right, or the subject matter of proprietary rights, profitable, alienable, inheritable
rights, which are often bound up with the tenure of land. In the second place, jurisdiction is
one of the main ties which keeps society together; the man is bound to his lord by this as well
as other bonds; he is not merely his lord's man and his lord's tenant, but he is also his lord's
"justiciable"; his lord is his "sovereign"; he owes to his lord not merely service but also suit;
and thus once more the law of jurisdiction is implicated with the land law.
I F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 527-32 (2d
ed. 1898) (footnotes omitted). Jurisdiction theory today likewise must be seen as one of the main indicia
of the relationship we wish to establish between individuals and their government. Unfortunately, we
often lose sight of the larger values in favor of a functional analysis of court organization.
1980]
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remains shrouded in historical dark ages. That a system of independent
Royal Courts did arise is recognized and that they fenced and parried with
each other to extend theirjurisdictional powers has been well documented.
Perhaps one reason attention was not given to the question of mandatory
jurisdiction in the early common law cases lay in the rule that jurisdiction
ordinarily could not be challenged.14 Certainly, a court that refuses to
allow challenges to its subject matter competence will not feel any com-
punction about exercising all of the jurisdiction that it can.
An essential feature in the development of the common law was that
the jurisdiction of the Royal Courts was ill defined. Jurisdiction was
acquired by assertion.'5 The rule of capture prevailed.16 Thus, the success-
ful exercise of jurisdiction was a fundamental constitutional tool for
determining the constellation of judicial power that could be exercised by a
common law court.17 Into this model the concept of mandatory jurisdic-
tion fits very nicely. A court desirous of exercising jurisdiction quickly
develops a thesis that controversies within its purview must be entertained.
To do otherwise raises the possibility that jurisdiction might be lost to
another court ready to provide a remedy. The assertion of the doctrine of
mandatory jurisdiction was then a tool, perhaps a necessary tool, but
nonetheless only a means by which the judicial system itself was created
and in time extended.
For example, in Ward's Case8 the court, in language that carried a
striking parallel to Marshall's statement in Cohens v. Virginia, stated:
"We, the judges, must maintain the jurisdiction of our Court, if the case is
not plainly and evidently outside its jurisdiction. . . ." When this state-
ment is viewed in the context of the policy being developed, however, a
different reason for the use of the doctrine appears. Ward's Case involved
the question whether it appeared from the pleadings that the plaintiffs
claim arose outside England. This was important because English law at
the time was insistent that actions based upon debt or covenant have some
relationship with an English county, i.e., the county in which the agree-
ment was made or in which the defendant might be best brought in to
answer.
19
14. Dobbs, The Decline of Jurisdiction By Consent, 40 N.C.L. REV. 49, 59, 66 (1961).
15. Just as the lack of assertion resulted in the loss ofjurisdiction, cf. H. CAM, LAW-FINDERS AND
LAW-MAKERS IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 37 (1962) ("Enforce the law; if you will not, my sheriff or my
justice shall, and you lose your 'court.' ").
16. The Rule of Capture authorizes the causing of something to migrate so as to be reduced to
physical ownership and possession by the mover. Although modem day application of the doctrine is
generally limited to mineral resources, see, e.g., Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implications
as Applied to Oil and Gas, 13 TEX. L. REV. 391 (1935), in the formative years of the common law courts
when jurisdictional rules were self-imposed and jurisdictional concepts vague and ambiguous, the
power to adjudicate could be acquired legitimately from another court simply through assertion by the
first court. Jurisdiction was respected as a matter of comity and self-preservation (the remedy of a
usurped court being self-help--"go and do likewise"), not as a matter of legal right. See note 22 infra.
17. Dobbs, The Decline of Jurisdiction by Consent, 40 N.C. L. Rev. 49, 54-55 (1961).
18. 82 Eng. Rep. 245 (K.B. 1662).
19. Blume, Place of Trial of Civil Cases, 48 MICH. L. REv. 1, 21-25 (1949).
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Expanding English commerce, however, was resulting in the making
of agreements outside of England. This was apparently the situation in
Ward's Case, as the obligation at issue bore date at Hamburg, in what is
now Germany. The decision in Ward's Case allowed suit to be maintained
in England inasmuch as (1) the declaration did not on its face show that the
instrument was made in a foreign country, and (2) the court was not
prepared to take judicial notice that Hamburg was not in the county in
which the action was laid.20
It can be stated that the observation of the court in Ward's Case that it
must exercise jurisdiction is nowhere supported in the decision. Why then
is it uttered? The statement certainly provided implicit support for the
approach the court took in justifying its willingness to assert jurisdiction in
a case where, from the perspective of precedent, that exercise was palpably
inappropriate. If the court did not have to exercise jurisdiction, it had less
justification in treating the failure of the pleading to establish the location
of Hamburg as immaterial. Since, however, the court had to exercise
jurisdiction unless it was "plainly and evidently" improper to do so, it
could more easily ignore the somewhat obvious fact that Hamburg was not
located in England. The use of the concept of mandatory jurisdiction aided
the court in establishing its subject matter competence by allowing the
court to avoid the impact of the then rigorous insistence of English law,
incompatible with growing trade and commerce, that the claim arise at
least partly in England.
Consideration of the jurisdiction issue, as by the court in Ward's Case
was rare. Most of the time the Royal Courts simply extended theirjurisdic-
tion without discussion. For example, in Stradling v. Morgan,E1 the Court
of Exchequer read with great liberality a statute apparently intended to
ameliorate some of the harshness attendant to the Confiscation Acts of
Henry the Eighth to reach a construction that the statute vested jurisdic-
tion in Exchequer over certain actions normally entertained in the Court of
Common Pleas. Jurisdiction was constantly seen as concurrent; this left it
to the self-interest of parties to select the court that could provide the best
remedy, which in turn redounded to the economic benefit of the court.22
The greatest remedy after all must be seen as access to a court; without
20. In Roberts v. Hamage, 91 Eng. Rep. 561 (K.B. 1704) this principle would crystalize into the
famous pleading from fiction that allowed English courts to pretend that such exotic locales as
Majorca or the East Indies were in London, England.
21. 75 Eng. Rep. 305 (Ex. 1559).
22. Judges of the Royal Courts received a considerable portion of their income from fees. I
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 252-55 (7th ed. 1956). This in turn engendered conscious
designs to usurp the jurisdiction of local manorial courts because they were profitable,see Dobbs, The
Decline of Jurisdiction by Consent, 40 N.C. L. REv. 49, 57 (1964), and spurred competition among the
Royal Courts to increase jurisdiction. See 1 R. NORTH, LIVES OFTHE NORTHS 203 (London 1826). And,
of course, the English lawyers accelerated these expansionistic policies since they practiced before
certain courts rather than for predetermined parties. It thus tended to advance their interests to
increase the jurisdiction of the court before which they practiced.
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access, no judgment and no remedy carrying the legal sanction of the state
is available.
On the other hand, the notion of mandatory jurisdiction was not
accepted unquestioningly. Chief Baron Saunders, concurring in Stradling
v. Morgan, did articulate a doctrine of discretionary jurisdiction, a doc-
trine that, according to Saunders, had been practiced by Exchequer for
several centuries.2 3 Saunders was of the view that, contrary to the opinion
of the other members of the court, jurisdiction in Exchequer over the
matter at issue in Stradling did not arise out of the fairly recent Act of
Parliament but was of ancient origin. Although the point was contravert-
ed, it was asserted that since ancient times Exchequer had been a proper
court to entertain common pleas between any of the king's subjects.
Jurisdiction had been declined not because of any want of power, but
rather by reason of the demands of the king's business. While Exchequer
had ceased to hold pleas between common people, it had done so as a
matter of discretion, not de rigore juris.
Although there are few concrete precedents on which to base an
opinion, the weight of available evidence favors the conclusion that the
common law did support a doctrine of mandatory jurisdiction; it did not
do so, however, by any clearly reasoned thesis. The doctrine of mandatory
jurisdiction rested neither exclusively upon natural right nor exclusively
upon the felt needs of society as defined by the then existing social milieu.
Rather, the doctrine was founded upon the desire of common law courts,
their functionaries, and their adherents to establish a sphere of power that
would accrue to their own benefit and be consistent with the emerging
political demands of society.24 The doctrine of mandatory jurisdiction was
thus a means by which certain desired ends could be achieved. The means
were not in any sense of the term "neutral"; rather, they were consciously
designed to allow the courts to reach the ends and goals that the courts, and
the larger society, wished to achieve.
B. The Incorporation of the Doctrine of Mandatory Jurisdiction into
American Jurisprudence
Although the acceptance of the common law in America was at times
23. 75 Eng. Rep. 305, 318-21 (Ex. 1559).
24. Although the desire to increase revenues underlie many jurisdiction disputes, it must not be
forgotten that jurisdiction expansion by the Royal Courts served a larger social purpose:
Was the crown not interested then in the financial aspect of the expansion of its law courts?
We are far from saying this and certain correlations which can be noticed between the price of
certain writs and their numbers, suggest a very watchful awareness on the part of the crown (if
tariffs for writs of grace were put too high, numbers went so much down that overall income
decreased). Nor will anyone deny that these kings could be ingenious when it came to feeding
the treasury. But we do submit that the crown's desire to see the law respected and to gain
control of its administration was the fundamental motive in the creation of the common law
system, together with the country's passion to take all possible litigation to the king's justices.
VON CAENEGEN, ROYAL WRITS IN ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO GLANVILLE 173-176 (Selden
Society Series No. 77, 1959), reprinted in S. KIMBALL, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYs-
TEM 87-88 (1966).
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halting, the early influence of a largely English trained and educated bar
and judiciary could not be denied.25 By the beginning of the nineteenth
century, the common law, or more accurately the common law system, had
clearly established itself as an integral part of American legal institutions,
particularly in the new federal government.26
Incorporation of the concept of mandatory jurisdiction into Ameri-
can jurisprudence owes a particular debt to Justices Marshall and Story,
who together used the doctrine first to justify constitutional judicial review
and then, once the Supreme Court's new role had been established, to
insulate it from partisan attacks.
The Marshall-Story contribution can only in part be predicated upon
the legislative mandate expressed in section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
which allowed for review by the United States Supreme Court of state
decisions involving federal questions.27 Although Story, in articulating a
principle of mandatory jurisdiction in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,28 relied
upon the provision extensively, and Marshall found consistency between
his view of mandatory jurisdiction and the same section 25 in Cohens v.
Virginia,29 reliance upon section 25 provides, in the end, no satisfactory
resolution of the question here presented. To state that Congress has
expressly required by enacted legislation that there shall be a right of access
to a federal forum does not establish the proposition that the courts
therefore must provide a forum. Such a formulation of the issue simply
begs the question whether Congress can require the federal courts to
exercise jurisdiction. While the existence of precedents such as Martin v.
25. J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND
BEGINNINGS TO 18013-8 (1971); 1 C. WARREN, HISTORY OFTHE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 126-150 (1970).
26. J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND
BEGINNINGS TO 1801 151-59 (1971); 1 C. WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 186-202
(1970).
27.
[A] final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law or equity of a State in
which a decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or
statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their
validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised
under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws
of the United States, and the decision is in favour of such their validity; or where is drawn in
question the construction of any clause of the Constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or
commission held under the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege
or exemption specially set up or claimed by either party, under such clause of the said
Constitution, treaty, statute or commission, may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in
the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error ....
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 STAT. 73, 85-86 (footnotes omitted).
28. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816).
29. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
30. The basic question is the assessment of the permissible bounds of involvement by Congress
into the affairs of the Court. Some involvement is constitutionally mandated: "The judicial Power of
the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Yet, how much is too much cannot be
determined by a literal review of the language of the Constitution. The question can be resolved only by
either a more explicit constitutional provision or an elaboration of "attitudes" that underlie the
development and formulation of constitutional jurisprudence.
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Hunter's Lessee and Cohens v. Virginia is respectable authority for the
proposition that Congress can so require, both decisions fail to articulate a
compelling reason why this is so. Indeed, in neither Hunter's Lessee nor
Cohens is the concept of mandatory jurisdiction bottomed on section 25.
Rather, in both cases (as in Marbury v. Madison, which was not a section
25 case), the concept of mandatory jurisdiction was predicated upon a
theory of jurisprudence shared by Marshall and Story, and which found
forceful articulation in their written opinions.
Although Mr. Justice Story's role should not be minimized, I would
like to direct attention to the philosophy and attitudes of Chief Justice
Marshall as it related to the development of the doctrine of mandatory
jurisdiction. This is due to the preeminence of Marshall's opinions in
American constitutional jurisprudence and because, at least insofar as it
affects the matter at hand, no perceptible difference separated the views of
31the two men.
It is natural that Marshall's jurisprudence should find articulate
expression in his treatment of the Constitution. During his arguments
before the Virginia ratifying convention, Marshall had stated the necessity
of judicial review:
Is it not necessary that the federal courts should have cognizance of cases
arising under the constitution, and the laws of the United States? What is the
service or purpose of a judiciary, but to execute the laws in a peaceable,
orderly manner, without shedding blood, or creating a contest, or availing
yourselves of force? If this be the case, where can its jurisdiction be more
necessary than here? To what quarter will you look for protection from an
infringement on the constitution, if you will not give power to the judiciary?
There is no other body that can afford such a protection.
3 2
Marshall, while a believer in the Blackstonian concept that courts are
but tools of the law,33 did not tie the concept to a literal interpretation of
law apart from existing social or economic theories to which he held
allegiance. Thus, for Marshall, the role of the Court was to accommodate
31. "[O]f the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, no two were ever closer in
views or in personal relations than Chief Justice Marshall of Virginia and Joseph Story of Massachu-
setts .. " C. WARREN, THE STORY-MARSHALL CORRESPONDENCE 1819-1831 7 (1 Anglo-American
Legal History Series No. 7, N.Y.U. Sch. of Law 1942).This is not to say that Marshall and Story always
saw issues in the same light; on the important issues involving the Supreme Court, however, their views
were inseparable. See G. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY 111-14 (describing a point of difference) 115
(noting their basic sense of unanimity) (1970). See generally 4A A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN
MARSHALL 59-116 (1919), which concludes with the following observation:
Events thus sharpened the hostility of Jefferson and his following to Marshall, butdrew
closer the bonds between the ChiefJustice and Joseph Story. Once under Marshall's pleasing,
steady, powerful influence, Story sped along the path of Nationalism until sometimes hewas
ahead of the great constructor who, as he advanced, was building an enduring and practicable
highway.
Id. at 116.
32. DEBATES AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA, CONVENED AT RICH-
MOND, ON MONDAY THE SECOND DAY OF JUNE, 1788, 393 (2d ed. 1805).
33. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("Questions, in their nature politi-
cal. . . . can never be made in this court.")
[Vol. 41:861
1980] MANDATORY JURISDICTION
the Constitution to the fundamental natural law proposition that laws are
meant to protect and are certainly presumed to respect the general princi-
ples governing private rights.34
It is well recounted of Marshall that he came to view the judiciary as
primary protector of the theory of Lockean liberalism that was thought by
him to underlie the Constitution, and against which constitutional adjudi-
cation was to be measured. 35 The interests of the state were to prevail, to
promote the general welfare. With respect to the political arrangements
established by the Constitution, each separate department was to concen-
trate upon creating a "real" government, a government unlike that previ-
ously existing under the Articles of Confederation, a government of true
sovereign power.36 Within this jurisprudential viewpoint, the necessity that
courts exercise their duly ordained jurisdiction became clear. The judicial
power having been established by the Constitution, it was to be exercised
consistently with the sovereign interests of the State or else, since no other
branch could exercise the judicial function, governmental interests would
suffer.
34. See R. FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL 77-78 (1968):
In short, for state, nation, and foreign countries, over subsidiary courts and sovereign
political powers alike, the federal judiciary was to perform the liberal tasks for which it had
been erected, as Marshall thought, by the people. Judicial review ensured that its judgments
could not be authoritatively challenged. The individual's rights were secured, his protector
dominant. As the sphere of private interest was extended by Lockean liberalism to edge out
the dignity intrinsic to community life, and thus to depreciate the importance of political
stature, office, and action, one might note that the place of that judiciary which protects
private rights increased correspondingly. The polity was broken into state and society, the
first ministerial to the second. The judiciary was the branch of the state that directly secured
to men the place earned by industrious talent exercised in the economy, as well as a chance to
engage as they wish in the other, less fundamental activities of society. As liberal society
elevated the ordinary and everyday interests of most men to unqualified primacy, the courts
as guardians of such concerns became pervasive in extent as well as first in dignity among the
departments. Man, wrote David Hume almost at the beginning of his essay Of the Origin of
Government, is engaged to establish political society, in order to administer justice, without
which there can be no peace among them, nor safety, nor mutual intercourse. We are,
therefore, to look upon all the vast apparatus of government, as having ultimately no other
object or purpose but the distribution ofjustice, or, in other words, the support of the twelve
judges. Kings and parliaments, fleets and armies, officers of the court and revenue, ambassa-
dors, ministers, and privy counsellors, are all subordinate in their end to this part ofadminis-
tration." Liberalism as well as judicial review accounts for the place of courts in America,
and, as we will see, judicial review itself was, in good part, a means of preserving liberalism.
See generally, R. FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL 45-56, 66-71, 85-90, 103-08
(1968). But see M. COHEN, THE FAITH OF A LIBERAL 178-80 (1946). Cohen argued that Marshall's
decision in Marbury was less the product of his philosophical principles than his fear of impeachment.
Nevertheless, however secure or insecure Marshall was in his tenure as Chief Justice in 1803, he
certainly was sufficiently secure during the great phase of the Marshall court (1815-1830) to render de
minimis any concerns he may have once had regarding his possible "political" impeachment.
35. MeCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404-05 (1819); R. FAULKNER, THE JURIS-
PRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL 47-48 (1968).
36. Marshall well expressed these sentiments in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187
(1824):
[V]hen these allied sovereigns [colonial states] converted their league into a government,
when they converted their Congress of Ambassadors, deputed to deliberate on their common
concerns, and to recommend measures of general utility, into a Legislature, empowered to
enact laws on the most interesting subjects, the whole character in which the States appear,
underwent a change, the extent of which must be determined by a fair consideration of the
instrument by which that change was effected.
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Under the settled nature of Marshall's jurisprudence, it was the
responsibility of the Court to guard the Constitution. Since that responsi-
bility had been entrusted to the judiciary, it could not be avoided. In Craig
v. Missouri,37 this issue of entrustment was explicitly set forth by Marshall.
Again, as in earlier cases,38 the question of state sovereignty and the power
of the federal government had been raised at cross purposes. In response to
the states' rights arguments raised by Missouri and the veiled threats of
forceful resistance to the Supreme Court's mandate, Marshall responded:
In the argument, we have been reminded by one side of the dignity of a
sovereign state; of the humiliation of her submitting herself to this tribunal; of
the dangers which may result from inflicting a wound on that dignity: by the
other, of the still superior dignity of the people of the United States; who have
spoken their will, in terms which we cannot misunderstand.
To these admonitions, we can only answer: that if the exercise of that
jurisdiction which has been imposed upon us by the constitution and laws of
the United States, shall be calculated to bring on those dangers which have
been indicated: or if it shall be indispensable to the preservation of the union,
and consequently of the independence and liberty of these states: these are
considerations which address themselves to those departments which may
with perfect propriety be influenced by them. This department can listen only
to the mandates of law; and can tread only that path which is marked out by
duty.39
Thus, we can see the basis for Marshalrs statements, implicit in Marbury
and explicit in Cohens, that the Court must exercise jurisdiction in a
controversy within its purview. The doctrine of constitutional review was
not political; but was in its very essence legal. In Marshalrs view, this
constituted a fundamental justification of the practice. And since it was
legal rights the Court was safeguarding under the aegis of constitutional
decisionmaking, it was certainly appropriate, if not essential, that the
Court fulfill its constitutional role by providing a forum in which those
same legal rights could be protected.4 °
Marshall was not unaware that the battle over the constitutionality of
Supreme Court review of state court decisions touched deeply the continu-
ing validity of the federal government. Marshall wrote: "The true and
37. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410 (1830).
38. See Warren, Legislative and JudicialAttacks on the Supreme Court ofthe United States-A
History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 Am. L. REv. 1, 161-81 (1913).
39. Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410,437-38 (1830). See also Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832), in which to the contention that the Court had no power to review final decisions of
state courts, Marshall replied:
It is, then, we think, too clear for controversy, that the act of congress, by which this court is
constituted, has given it the power, and of course imposed on it the duty, of exercising
jurisdiction in this case. This duty, however unpleasant, cannot be avoided. Those who fill the
judicial department have no discretion in selecting the subjects to be brought before them.
Id. at 541.
40. Modern defenders of the concept of mandatory jurisdiction have based their arguments
largely upon the "entrustment" argument used by Marshall in Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410
(1803), and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). See, e.g., R. DWORKIN,TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY xii (1977) ("Legal rights may then be identified as a distinct species of a political right, that
is, an institutional right to the decision of a court in its adjudicative function.").
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substantial dividing line between parties .. . [amounts to the question
whether] our constitution is essentially a League and not a Government."
41
On a less lofty note, the consequences of nullifying Supreme Court
review by revocation of section 25 were well stated in Warren's interesting
account of the view of one protagonist in the twilight years of the battle
over section 25:
In April, 1832, when the excitement over the Georgia situation was at its
height, Hammond, in an article in the Cincinnati Gazette, of which he was
editor, commented on the curious fact that when, in 1821, Ohio "was enacting
nullification and Supreme Court was restraining her within her constitutional
orbit," South Carolina and Georgia then stood by the Supreme Court against
Kentucky and Ohio; but that now in 1832 "when South Carolina and Georgia
wage the war, Ohio and Kentucky breast it." And he concluded with the
following sensible and loyal statement:
"During the Ohio contest in which circumstances made me rather a
conspicuous actor, I was forcibly struck by a remark in the National
Intelligencer in relation to the controversy and my part in it. The remark
was to this effect: 'If Mr. Hammond is the man we take him to be, we
warrant he would give one or two of his fingers to get honorably and
safely out of his situation and have the conflict ended.'
I felt that the Intelligencer was right, and I doubt not that thousands of
the South Carolinians and Georgians feel now in the same way. The fact is,
the government of the United States is the source of all our prosperity.
Without its salutary restraints, the sectional collisions that unavoidably
spring up will soon engender violent feuds terminating in open war.
It is only through the Supreme Court that this salutary restraint can be
made impartially and effectually operative. It is somewhere remarked by
Chief Justice Marshall that a single State may often seek to control the action
of the government of the United States; but no State will ever agree that
another State than itself shall exercise this control. Herein is the safety of the
Union. 42
The doctrine of mandatory jurisdiction thus again served as the means
by which a substantive end (preservation of the Union) was achieved. It is
interesting to observe the similarities between the method by which both
the common law courts and Chief Justice Marshall engrafted the doctrine
of mandatory jurisdiction onto the law. Both used means that did not
themselves receive clear development or subsequent critical commentary.
For example, Marshall's decisions, which established the supremacy of the
Supreme Court over state courts, were bitterly criticized on the merits but
that criticism does not appear to have been directed toward the concept of
mandatory jurisdiction itself. Perhaps this was reflective of the fact that the
battle over the Court's jurisdiction had moved to Congress. Here it now lay
41. Letter from John Marshall to Thomas F. Grimk6, October 6, 1832 (ALS, Original in the
Archives Division of the Virginia State Library), reprinted in R. FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
JOHN MARSHALL 100-01 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
42. Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United States-A
History of the Twentv-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 ANt. L. REv. 1, 174 (1913) (footnotes
omitted).
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in the interest of those who would restrict the Court's jurisdiction to argue
that Marshall was correct, that the Court's jurisdiction when vested was
mandatory, for this would support the theory that in the absence of a
vesting of jurisdiction by Congress, the Court would be powerless to act. It
became the interest of all concerned to champion the cause of mandatory
jurisdiction, though for different reasons and for different goals.
In considering the incorporation of the concept of mandatory juris-
diction into American law, it is also helpful to note the interrelationship
between the jurisprudence of Marshall and his views of the American
experience under the Articles of Confederation. Marshall's perceptions of
the then recent experience of governance under the Articles of Confedera-
tion was a fundamental factor in formulating the jurisprudential views he
would articulate during his term as Chief Justice. For Marshall, the doc-
trine of mandatory jurisdiction would constitute a means by which central
government supremacy, which Marshall espoused as a remedy to political
difficulties realized under the Articles of Confederation, would not be
lost.
43
In this vein, Marshall provides us in his biography of George Wash-
ington with a very explicit statement of his views of the situation in the
country during the critical period from 1783 to 1787. 44 In Marshall's eyes,
the clear defect in the government under the Confederation was its inabili-
ty, as a central government, to enforce its will. Rather, it depended upon
the solicitousness of the states to approve any action that the Congress
undertook. This manifested itself in several ways. First, it was shown by
the inability of the national government to make safe and satisfy the trade
debts and other obligations incurred prior to the Revolution, and the
indebtedness incurred during the Revolution as a means of financing the
war effort. 5 In this context, Marshall's concepts of the obligations of a
government to its creditors were entirely consistent with his judicial views
of the primacy of property interests as a means by which the goodness and
benefit of government upon all the people could be realized. 4 Second,
other points of disquietude voiced by Marshall that pointed to the ineffec-
tiveness of the central government under the Articles of Confederation
43. Even though there was a divergence of views regarding the proper scopea new reconstituted
government should take, there certainly was a general consensus during this epochal period (1783-87)
that a change in the structure of government under the Articles of Confederation had to be achieved.
See generally C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 6-14,27-29,44,45,54 (2d ed. 1937); 3 W.
WILSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, 38, 59-60 (1902).
44. 4 J. MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 140 (1925).
45. Id. at 141-47, 177-79.
46. Thus, Marshall observed in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133 (1810), that courts
are by definition "those tribunals which are established for the security of property, and to decide on
human rights ... " That in referring to "rights" Marshall contemplated property rights, as opposed
to moral rights such as equality, is clear. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213,345-47 (1827)
(Marshall dissenting):
If, on tracing the right to contract, and the obligations created by contract, to their source, we
find them to exist anterior to, and independent of society, we may reasonably conclude that
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likewise had an origin and terminus in the inability of the central govern-
ment to exercise real sovereign power. Thus, the inability of the central
government to regulate commerce had a devastating effect upon the
commercial system pursued by the traders of the new American republic.
With the conclusion of the Revolutionary War, ports previously open to
American traders were closed. As noted by Marshall, "[flew were so
sanguine as to hope that thirteen independent governments, jealous of
each other, could be induced to concur for a length of time, in measures
capable of producing the desired effect. 47 Thus, the creation of a central
government with the authority to regulate trade and commerce would
provide a mechanism by which the government of the United States and
the independent European powers would be equally important to each
other, and therefore commercial intercourse of a nature beneficial to both
might be established. Without such an arrangement, however, these inter-
ests could not be protected. 48 Third, there was a general realization by the
European powers, and by a growing number of Americans, that govern-
ment under the Articles of Confederation, while perhaps consistent with
republican norms, was hardly efficient or beneficial in the long run. The
first and foremost manifestation of this was the inability of the central
government to comply with various treaty provisions by which the Revolu-
tionary War had been concluded. Because the central government was
unable to comply, the other signatory, Great Britain, felt no compunction
to comply either. 49 The effect of the inability of the central government to
enforce treaty obligations50 had a rippling effect upon other nations that
claimed or retained an interest in the New World, and thus gave rise to a
potentially devastating movement by which the western territories of the
those original and pre-existing principles are, like many other natural rights, brought with
man into society; and, although they may be controlled, are not given by human legisla-
tion . ..
[The obligation of contract is intrinsic and] results from the right which every man retains to
acquire property, to dispose of that property according to his own judgment, and to pledge
himself for a future act. These rights are not given by society but are brought into it ...
This reasoning is, undoubtedly, much strengthened by the authority of those writers on
natural and national law, whose opinions have been viewed with profound respect by the
wisest men of the present, and of past ages.
Id. See generally R. FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL 5-8, 71-79 (1968).
47. 4 J. MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 180 (1925).
48. Id. This was aggravated by the refusal of the British to concludeatreaty ofcommerce with
the new American nation. Thus, ports formerly open to American shipping became foreign ports and
were closed against them. See J. BASSETT, THE FEDERALIST SYSTEM 58-59 (1906); 3 W. WILSON, A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 32 (1902).
49. 3 W. Wilson, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 56 (1902).
50. Id. at 20:
The Confederation bound itself to urge upon the States unconditional amnesty for the
loyalists and a complete restoration of their estates and civil rights, and to prevent so far as
possible, any legal obstacles being put in the way of the collection of the debts due British
merchants at the outbreak of the war. Dr. Franklin had very candidly explained to the British
commissioners that the Congress of the Confederation had no power to enforce these articles:
that it could only advise the States, and that they would be free to follow or to disregard it
entirely and even scornfully, being bent upon ...virtually wiping out all debts owed to
Englishmen.
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new American nation may have been wrested from the new government,
because the territories might find that it was in their own interests to align
with the Spanish interests in the Mississippi River and the port of New
Orleans.51
This is not meant to serve as an historical review of the experiences
under the Articles of Confederation. Rather, it is intended to sketch lightly
the experiences during that time, as perceived by Marshall, with the
intuitive expectation that these perceptions would have a meaningful
impact upon Marshall when, as Chief Justice, he was in a position to
influence the development of constitutional doctrine. Indeed, Marshall
provided just such a justification for several of the controversial decisions
rendered in the period between 1815-1830. In writing to Story, concerning
the Bank of the United States case, Marshall observed: "But prejudice will
swallow anything. If the principles which have been advanced on this
occasion were to prevail, the Constitution would be converted into the old
confederation.
5 2
Again writing to Story, commenting generally on several vitriolic
criticisms leveled at his decision affirming the power of the Court to
declare state acts unconstitutional, Marshall observed:
In support of the sound principles of the Constitution [and] of the Union of
the States, not a pen is drawn. In Virginia the tendency of things verges
rapidly to the destruction of the government [and] the re-establishment of a
league of sovereign states. I look elsewhere for safety.53
Marshall's most trenchant criticisms were delivered in a letter to Story,
dated September 18, 1821. Marshall noted:
A deep design to convert our government into a mere league of states has
taken strong hold of a powerful [and] violent party in Virginia. The attack
upon the judiciary is in fact an attack upon the union. The judiciary depart-
ment is well understood to be th-t through which the government may be
attacked most successfully because it is without patronage, [and] of course
without power. And it is equally well understood that every subtractionfrom
its jurisdiction is a vital wound to the government itself The attack upon it
therefore is a masked battery aimed at the government itself.54
The receiver of this correspondence was of a like mind. Story had written
to Marshall in June, 1821, and, with respect to the attacks leveled upon the
Court as a result of the decision in Cohens v. Virginia, commented:
As to the decision of the Supreme Court in Cohens v. Virginia, I believe it
meets with general approbation among our professional gentlemen. I have
not heard of any diversity of opinion respecting it among any of our party
lawyers. The people here are disposed to place confidence in Courts; & when
51. See J. BASSETT, THE FEDERALIST SYSTEM 69-72 (1906).
52. C. WARREN, THE STORY-MARSHALL CORRESPONDENCE (1819-1831) 2-3 (1 Anglo-American
Legal History Series No. 7, N.Y.U. Sch. of Law 1942).
53. Id. at 16.
54. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
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they decide after full argument, they are generally satisfied. But on subjects
like this we are as yet inoculated with no disease. Massachusetts is attached to
the Union & has no jealousy of its powers; & no political object to answer in
crying up 'State rights'-We should dread to see the government reduced as
Virginia wished it, to a confederacy; & we are disposed to construe the
Constitution of the U.S. as a frame of government & not as a petty charter
granted to a paltry corporation for the purpose of regulating a fishery or
collecting a toll. The opinion of our best lawyers is unequivocally with the
Supreme Court, heartily & resolutely. They consider your opinion in Cohens
v. Virginia as a most masterly & convincing argument, & as the greatest of
your judgments. Allow me to say that nowhere is your reputation more
sincerely cherished than here; & however strange it may sound in Virginia, if
you were known here only by this last opinion, you could not wish for more
unequivocal fame.55
Although there is certainly nothing in the experience under the Articles of
Confederation that leads directly to the establishment of the doctrine of
mandatory jurisdiction, it is certainly consistent with Marshall's desire
that a mechanism be present within the central government by which the
experiences under the Confederation would not be repeated. It is, more-
over, entirely consistent with Marshall's September 18th letter in which he
equated attacks upon the Court's jurisdiction as attacks upon the govern-
ment. Both the new government and the Court were essential; both had to
stand or fall together. It thus appears that the development of the doctrine
of mandatory jurisdiction as an article III requirement finds justification
not by reason of its inherent validity as legal doctrine, but rather as a
mechanism by which the position being asserted by the Court would be
facilitated. Moreover, in the face of a quite pronounced antagonism
towards the role being adopted by the Court while Marshall was Chief
Justice, the concept of mandatory jurisdiction served as a deflecting rod by
which the Court could point out that it desired not to usurp power but
merely served as the chosen mechanism under the Constitution by which
necessary decisions, however unpopular, were to be rendered. In essence,
since jurisdiction was mandatory and had to be exercised, the Court could
not exercise its discretion to refuse to decide a case, but had to proceed to a
determination because the Constitution, which the Court had sworn an
oath to uphold,56 so demanded.
C. Summary
Thus far, I have attempted to outline the historical development of the
doctrine of mandatory jurisdiction. If the material is sketchy, it is in great
part reflective of the absence of its articulation and incorporation into
constitutional doctrine. In each case (at early common law or during the
time of the Marshall Court) in which the doctrine found initial early
55. Id. at 7.
56. Just as Bracton recounted the king has sworn a coronation oath to providejustice and peace
to his subjects. See note I I supra.
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acceptance, it did not constitute the main holding of the case. Rather, it
was a means to an end. While one cannot ignore the presence of the
doctrine in the cases, one should not necessarily accept that the doctrine is
therefore impregnable. Viewed as a tool, the doctrine served a purpose in
formulating, for purposes of American jurisprudence, the primacy of the
Supreme Court as the final interpreter of the Constitution. That task is
accomplished, however, or so it seems, and attention should now be
directed to assessing what function the doctrine plays in our present era,
given the role the Court has chosen to play, or has been compelled to play,
in society. Having fulfilled its original purpose, is the tool of mandatory
jurisdiction still needed or can it be directed to new ends?
II. THE JUDICIAL NEGATION OF THE CONCEPT OF
MANDATORY JURISDICTION
Although the doctrine of mandatory jurisdiction was not expressly
delineated in Marbury v. Madison, a theory of discretionary power to
decline to exercise jurisdiction is theoretically inconsistent with the spirit
of the decision.57 It was that implicit assumption of obligatory jurisdiction
that allowed the Court to expound so forcefully the primacy of the Court
as the ultimate oracle of constitutional doctrine. Without establishing the
validity of the premise that courts must exercise jurisdiction, Marshall
used the premise (in much the same vein as was done in Ward's Case) to
provide a sympathetic context for rejection of the claim that the Court's
original jurisdiction could be expanded by statute. If followed that since
the Court was obligated to hear cases properly before it, the result reached
in Marbury rested upon a firmer foundation than judicial restraint; rather,
it rested upon a bedrock of constitutional interpretation that the Court had
an obligation to undertake. Certainly Marbury could have been decided
without raising or considering the unarticulated premise of mandatory
jurisdiction, but its brooding omnipresence lent an aura of compellingness
and hence persuasiveness that otherwise would have been lacking.58 Simi-
larly, in a succession of cases decided by the Marshall Court in which the
57. See note 2 supra.
58. Had Marbury rested upon the mere discretionary disinclination of the Court to provide a
forum, the formidable edifice of judicial review would have lacked the necessary cornerstone of
compulsion. See D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 6 (2d ed. 1975):
[S]everal important and timely issues of judicial power depend in large part upon one's
conception of the policy or the philosophy of government that gives rise to judicial review.
The opinion in Marbury v. Madison is ambiguous on this score. Sometimes Marshall
appears to treat judicial review as something of an accident, an incidental consequence of the
court's basic job of deciding particular cases, a sort of clean-hands doctrine forjudges:. ...
In the same vein is the suggestion that judges ought not themselves to violate the
Constitution, and their oath to support it, by enforcing invalid laws. Notice that this theory is
in accord with a widely accepted view of the law-making powers of the courts in all kinds of
cases.
Other passages in the opinion, however, suggest that Marshall viewed judicial review as
an instrument for keeping the Congress within constitutional bounds, a vital element in a
system of checks and balances. . ..
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supremacy of the federal government and the Supreme Court was esta-
blished, a common thread throughout was a sense of obligation to decide,
a sense of duty imposed by law, whatever the consequences.59
At the time of the Marshall Court, the doctrine of mandatory jurisdic-
tion possessed a fair degree of utility. It aided in the creation of a sense of
correspondence between the higher ideals of observance of law and the
baser motive of the establishment and assertion of power. If the doctrine of
mandatory jurisdiction was a judicial "makeweight," as it historically had
been, it was a device that was sensitive to the myths and principles that
underlie the ideal of law. That it gave sustenance to the vision of govern-
ment expressed in the Constitution by its "Federalists" proponents was, of
course, helpful.
Thus, the doctrine of mandatory jurisdiction was instrumentally
functional; it closed the gap between law as it was and what it was believed
law needed to be. That the Marshall Court was successful in its endeavors
is obvious to any student of the federal courts and the federal system today.
Yet, the gap between law and the social necessities of society has a
perpetual tendency to reopen. Doctrines formulated in one era to close the
gap may be irrelevant, may indeed be a hindrance, when applied to the
gaps of a subsequent era. Because our legal system is founded upon a
theory of precedent, however, legal doctrines have a tendency, as Maitland
noted, to rule us from the grave. This respect for precedent is in part
composed of respect for accumulated learning and experience, and in part
upon the wish not to transgress the superstitious disrelish for change that a
legal system always exhibits.60
In the aftermath of Marbury, Hunter's Lessee, and Cohens, the social
necessities changed from establishing the idea of the supremacy of federal
law to defining the scope of that idea as applied to specific problems of
government. Indeed, the whole fabric of constitutional decision making
changed as Congress forcefully began to assert a federal presence, and it
now befell the Court to define the scope of power possessed rather than
establish the bare existence of the power.
59. Perhaps this sense of duty was best conveyed by Justice Story who expressed his views in a
letter to Professor George Ticknor of Harvard College, March 8, 1832:
We have just decided the Cherokee case, and reversed the decisions of the State Court of
Georgia, and declared her laws unconstitutional. The decision produced a very strong
sensation in both houses; Georgia is full of anger and violence. What she will do, it is difficult
to say. Probably she will resist the execution of our judgment, and if she does I do not believe
the President will interfere unless public opinion among the religions [sic] of the Eastern and
Western and Middle States should be brought to bear strong upon him. The rumor is that he
has told the Georgians he will do nothing. I, for one, feel quite easy on this subject, be the
event what it may. The Court has done its duty. Let the Nation now do theirs. If we have a
Government, let its command be obeyed; if we have not, it is as well to know it at once, and to
look to consequences.
Quoted in Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United States-A
History of the Thventy-Fifih Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 AM. L. Rav. 1, 170 (1913).
60. See generally H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 587-89 (1958); Merryman, The Authority ofAuthority, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613
(1954).
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Had the Court been free of the methodology by which the decisions in
Marbury and its progeny were reached, perhaps a neater accomodation of
competing federal-state interests could have been achieved. As it was,
broad assertions of congressional power, expressed in loose grants of
jurisdiction to the federal courts, threatened to besiege and inundate the
federal courts in a series of matters that only lightly involved federal
61interests, or that presented the problem at a time that was premature
insofar as then-developed concepts of federal interest and concern were
involved.62
The response of the Court was to pay homage to the expressed ideal of
mandatory jurisdiction while at the same time eviscerating the concept by a
series of exceptions that soon swallowed the rule whenever, in the eyes of
the Court, the rule needed to be swallowed.
Perhaps the clearest expression of the Court's Janus-faced approach
to the concept of mandatory jurisdiction was expressed in an abstention63
61. An example of this is the grant of general federal question jurisdiction that was statutorily
phrased in terms that were the mirror image of the boundaries of federaIjudicial power expressed in the
Constitution. The consequence of this loose phrasing was that the federal courts were engulfed in cases
in which the federal interest was limited to the fact that one of the parties had a federal charter, see, e.g.,
The Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1884), or the predecessor in title was the federal
government-a particularly ironic situation since the policy of the federal government was simply to
divest itself of the title through private settlement. See M. CLAWSON & B. HELD, THE FEDERAL LANDS:
THEIR USE AND MANAGEMENT 22-27 (1957). As a result of the caseload pressures upon the federal
courts thus engendered, the Court restricted the scope of federal jurisdiction by articulating a series of
rigid, formal doctrines that effectively removed from the original jurisdiction of federal courts large
classes of cases in which federal interests were generally marginal. And while the line of demarcation
between true federal cases and cases only containing federal issues was highly artificial, it was
compelled largely because the Court felt constrained to retain allegiance to the concept of mandatory
jurisdiction. This allegiance was in turn maintained by "strained" interpretations and constructions of
federal jurisdiction statutes that, while parroting a theme of obligatoryjurisdiction, allowed the federal
courts to avoid accepting the case by "finding" that the case did not come within the jurisdictional
grant. See generally Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise "Directly"
Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890 (1967).
62. Thus, federal jurisdiction over individuals deprived of their liberty by the states, which had
been provided by Congress by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 385 (1867) (current version at28
U.S.C. § 2254 (1976)), was delayed by a judicially created exhaustion requirement. See Ex parte
Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886):
We cannot suppose that Congress intended to compel . . . (the federal courts] . . . to
draw to themselves, in the first instance, the control of all criminal prosecutions commenced
in State courts. . . . The injunction to hear the case summarily, and thereupon "to dispose
of the party as law and justice require" does not deprive the court of discretion as to the time
and mode in which it will exert the powers conferred upon it.
The Court's assessment of congressional intent is particularly interesting when it is remembered that
the extension of habeas to state prisoners was intended by Congress to provide a safe harbor for
Negroes against hostile state practices. See 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES - RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88,448 (1971). Viewed more charitably, what
manifestly occurred was that the need, or perception of need, for immediate federal involvement had
disappeared with the End of Reconstruction.
63. Although there are variant forms of abstention, see Field, Abstention in Constitutional
Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071, 1147-62 (1974),
abstention generally is predicated upon a desire to avoid unnecessary federal adjudications of constitu-
tional dimension. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941).
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case, England v. Louisiana Board of Medical Examiners,64 in which the
Court stated:
There are fundamental objections to any conclusion that a litigant who
has properly invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to consider
federal constitutional claims can be compelled, without his consent and
through no fault of his own, to accept instead a state court's determination of
those claims. Such a result would be at war with the unqualified terms in
which Congress, pursuant to constitutional authorization, has conferred
specific categories of jurisdiction upon the federal courts, and with the
principle that "When a Federal court is properly appealed to in a case over
which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdic-
tion. . . .. The right of a party plaintiff to choose a Federal court where there
is a choice cannot be properly denied."65
The Court, having expressed an obligation to decide the controversy,
immediately proceeded to dismantle the requirement by inexplicably
noting that delay in providing a forum does not infringe upon the duty to
decide:
66
Nor does anything in the abstention doctrine require or support such a result.
Abstention is a judge-fashioned vehicle for according appropriate deference
to the "respective competence of the state and federal court systems." Louisi-
ana P. & L. Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29. Its recognition of the role of
state courts as the final expositors of state law implies no disregard for the
64. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
65. Id. at 415-16, quoting Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909) (footnotes
omitted).
66. The Court's distinction between delay and total avoidance in receiving the case was tenuous
at best. First, delays caused by abstention imposed stays are generally lengthy. See P. BATOr, P.
MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEMI 994 (2d ed.
1973).
One of the principal costs of abstention is the prolonged delay it often brings in its wake. In
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, for example, over six years elapsed between the
Supreme Court's decision requiring abstention, 323 U.S. 101 (1944), and the Court's ultimate
decision on the merits, 340 U.S. 602 (195 1), while in United States v. Leiter Minerals, Inc., 381
U.S. 413 (1965), the case was dismissed as moot eight years after abstention was ordered. The
burdens of delay seemed great enough to Justice Douglas to warrant a complete reexamina-
tion of the Pullman doctrine, see England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Exam'rs, 375
U.S. 411,423 (1964) (concurring opinion). And though other members of the Court have not
gone that far, protracted delay and its consequences have not infrequently been cited among
the reasons for refusing abstention in particular cases. See, e.g., Harman v. Forssenius, 380
U.S. 528 (1965); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964); Griffin
v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 228-29 (1964).
Second, several variants of the abstention doctrine involve not delay but actual dismissal of the federal
action, with the promise of later federal review of the complaint being illusory. See, e.g., Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (action to enjoin state criminal prosecution, denied); Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968) (abstention ordered in diversity action involving dispute over
water rights on private land.) In the Younger-type action, the injury issue (being illegally subjected to
state criminal proceedings) is largely mooted if the federal court delays asserting jurisdiction. See
Developments in the Law - Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1133 (1977).
[he decision to discuss Younger in forum allocation terms is itself a decision of constitu-
tional significance. It is a decision that the only constitutional issue at stake is the validity of
the challenged state law-that beingprosecuted under an arguable (or actually) invalid law is
not itself a deprivation.
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primacy of the federal judiciary in deciding questions of federal law. Accord-
ingly, we have on several occasions explicitly recognized that abstention
"does not, of course, involve the abdication of federal jurisdiction, but only
the postponement of its exercise. 67
Surely, it might be said that the Court is never more decisive than when it
comes to avoiding decisions.
The abstention doctrine is just one of the devices by which the exercise
of federal jurisdiction is stilled. The abstention doctrine is aided and
abetted by a variety of devices that in their essence either delay eventual
federal review, or tend to deny federal court review at a certain level,
generally the level of the federal district court.68 Judicial avoidance of the
Id. at 1285-86 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). In the diversity action, since state law issues
are determinative, delay is the equivalent of avoidance since there is nothingfor the federal court to do
after the state court has disposed of the state law issues. See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 590 (1874) (federal jurisdiction depends upon claim or defense asserted arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States and is limited to those claims and defenses); P.
BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
998 (2d ed. 1973): "[I]f all the issues in the case are issues of state law, the usual consequence of
abstention would be not merely to postpone but to relinquish the exercise of federal jurisdiction."
Finally, where a federal court stays its preceedings by abstaining, the normal course is for the plaintiff
to present both his state and federal issues to the state court for resolution. In England v. Louisiana Bd.
of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964), the Court specifically noted that such a procedure
"preserves" the litigants federal issues:
[A] party may readily forestall any conclusion that he has elected not to return to the District
Court. He may accomplish this by making on the state record the "reservation to the
disposition of the entire case by the state courts" that we referred to in Button. That is, he may
inform the state courts that he is exposing his federal claims there only for the purpose of
complying with Windsor, and that he intends, should the state courts hold against him on the
question of state law, to return to the District Court for disposition of his federal contentions.
Such an explicit reservation is not indispensable; the litigant is in no event to be denied his
right to return to the District Court unless it clearly appears that he voluntarily did more than
Windsor required and fully litigated his federal claims in the state courts. When the reserva-
tion has been made, however, his right to return will in all events be preserved.
Id. at 421-22 (footnotes omitted). It should be noted that the Court's approach nicely eviscerates the
statutory provisions contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948), which require federal courts to give full faith
and credit to state court proceedings. See Fischer, Institutional Competence: Some Reflections on
Judicial Activism in the Realm of Forum Allocation between State and Federal Courts, 34 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 175, 207-11 (1980).
Judicial attempts to reconcile the principles of finality and repose that underlie 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1948), the goals of the civil rights legislation, and the normative attitudes that underlie congressional
grants of concurrent jurisdiction over civil rights cases to state and federal courts have been unavailing.
Compare Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 976 (1975)
(prior state court adjudications no bar to maintenance of civil rights action and relitigation of issues
attendant thereto in federal court), with Taylor v. New York City Transit Auth., 433 F.2d 665 (2d Cir.
1970) (prior state judicial and administrative adjudications bar maintenance of civil rights action and
relitigation of decided issues of fact in federal court). See generally Note, The Preclusive Effect of State
Judgments on Subsequent 1983 Actions, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 610 (1978).
67. 375 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1964) (footnotes omitted).
68. These avoidance-deferral devices include exhaustion, see, e.g., McNeese v. Board of Educ.,
373 U.S. 668 (1963) and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); certification, see Lehman Bros. v.
Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974); cf. Wolfson & Kurland, Certificates by State Courts of the Existence ofa
Federal Question, 63 HARV. L. REV. 111 (1949); Note, Florida's Interjurisdictional Certification: A
Reexamination to Promote Expanded National Use, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 21 (1969). The certification
device seems to have the approval of the commentators. See, e.g., Lillich & Mundy, Federal Court
Certification of Doubtful State Law Questions, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 888 (1971); McKusick, Certifica-
tion: A Procedure for Cooperation Between State and Federal Courts, 16 ME. L. REv. 33 (1964),
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obligation to decide has generally been predicated upon a concern that a
federal court in exercising jurisdiction either would needlessly meddle in
affairs of concern to the states, 69 or would accomplish no more than
provide a duplicate forum and raise the possibility of different results and
although doubts as to its utility remain. See In re Elliot, 74 Wash. 2d 600, 640, 446 P.2d 347, 371 (1968)
(Hale, J., dissenting):
The majority opinion suggests that the certification statute will usher in a new era of efficiency
and speed up the now ponderous and sometimes seemingly immobile processes of the law, but
this idea seems hardly borne out by the experiences cited. If there ever was a way in which to
delay a case as it moves slowly through the courts, in my opinion, it would be the very
procedure whereby at one stage the case comes to a halt in the federal system, moves over into
the state system to await docketing, briefing, hearing, writing, filing of the opinion and
petition for rehearing and then moves back again into the system of origin to take its place on
the judicial conveyer for resumption of proceedings in the federal system. I think a reading of
all cases cited in the majority opinion and common sense as well will demonstrate that the
certification procedure is a dilatory one and in the long run compounds the very delays it is
claimed to help curtail and magnifies the uncertainties it is claimed to eliminate.
See also Mattis, Certification of Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands of the
Federal Courts, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 717 (1969). Further avoidance-deferral devices include justicia-
bility concepts that operate on the borderline of article III requirements and judicially devised,
nonconstitutional prudential standards, that channel and divert from the federal courts cases raising
questions of constitutional dimension. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). In Warth the plaintiffs
had probably met the article III injury in fact and causation test that appears to constitute the
constitutional requirement, see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59
(1978), yet, the Court found the case not to be justiciable. The clear implication is that the Court
avoided the case for nonconstitutional, prudential concerns. See note 71 infra. Federal jurisdiction
may also be avoided by a refusal to apply a literal interpretation of jurisdiction clauses of the
Constitution.
See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930).
The words quoted from the Constitution do not of themselves and without more exclude the
jurisdiction of the state. . . .The statutes do not purport to exclude the State Courts from
jurisdiction except where they grant it to the Courts of the United States. Therefore they do
not affect the present case if it be true as has been unquestioned for three-quarters of a century
that the Courts of the United States have no jurisdiction over divorce. If when the Constitu-
tion was adopted the common understanding was that the domestic relations of husband and
wife and parent and child were matters reserved to the States, there is no difficulty in
construing the instrument accordingly and not much in dealing with the statutes.
Id. at 383-84, citing Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U.S. 511 (1898). Although there
exists a similarity in approach between the Supreme Court's limitation of federal questionjurisdiction,
see note 60 supra, and what the Court accomplished in Popovici, the difference is significant.
Limitations of federal question jurisdiction are reversible by congressional edict; limitations on federal
jurisdiction because of a total commitment to the state judiciary under the Constitution resist
legislative revision. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1186-92 (2d ed. 1973).
69. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971):
Since the beginning of this country's history Congress has, subject to few exceptions,
manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from interference by federal
courts ...
The precise reasons for this longstanding public policy against federal court interference with
state court proceedings have never been specifically identified but the primary sources of the
policy are plain. One is the basic doctrine of equityjurisprudence that courts of equity should
not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving
party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable
relief. ...
This underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal
prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of"comity," that is,
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up
of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National
Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their
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interforum conflict,7° or that judicial involvement at a particular stage of
the controversy, although possible, would be premature because a suffi-
ciently specific resolution of the case is not available due to the current
state of the record.71
The propriety of the use by federal courts of avoidance-deferral
devices has been both criticized72 and approved.73 Interestingly, the criti-
cism that has been voiced has largely relied upon the immutability of the
concept of mandatory jurisdiction. Yet, as previously noted, the doctrine
of mandatory jurisdiction is not a self-evident truth in any sense of the
term.74 Indeed, the doctrine has been shown to basically have been devel-
oped to facilitate the achievement of larger, substantive goals. Yet, the
legacy of the doctrine has tended to confuse the issue whether jurisdiction
avoidance-deferral practices are proper. Not having examined the roots of
the doctrine or the reasons for its creation, we find ourselves tied to
applying the doctrine to situations in which the utility of its use is less than
compelling. Indeed, in many instances adherence to the doctrine has
resulted in palpably bad legal decisions and doctrines. 75 The time has come
separate functions in their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to
describe it, is referred to by many as "Our Federalism," and one familiar with the profound
debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is bound to respect those who
remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of "Our Federalism."
70. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Adkins, 330 F.2d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1964):
The Federal Declaratory Judgments Act affords a new remedy, whereby one charged with
infringement can initiate an action in the federal court. This creates possibilities of conflict
between the federal court and a state court whenever there is a contract between the parties
relating to the patent, and the patent holder has brought an action in the state court based
upon the contract. It is not only in patent cases that the Federal Declaratory Judgements Act
has opened up such possibilities of conflict, and it is in cases involving such possibilities of
conflict that the courts have upheld the exercise by a federal court of its discretion to withhold
declaratory judgment pending decision of the state court action.
71. Compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (attack by developers on exclusionary zoning
ordinance not justiciable absent allegations that a viable construction project currently was blocked by
defendant's ordinances or refusal to grant approvals or variances) with Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (attack by developer on exclusionary zoning
ordinance justiciable). One ground for distinguishing the two cases is that relief in Warth would have
been based upon the facial constitutionality of the exclusionary zoning ordinance itself rather than a
mere application of the ordinance to a specific problem, as in Arlington Heights. Seen in this light, the
process is in keeping with a general theme of the Court to exercise restraint in shapingjudicial remedies
and in recognizing legal rights. The adequate and independent state grounds doctrine, Murdock v. City
of Memphis 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874), can likewise be considered as falling within this justification.
When the state law issue may make the exercise of federal jurisdiction a nullity, deferral until the
question of final determination by state law has been resolved avoids "premature" assertions of federal
interest and concern.
72. See, e.g., Gunther, The Subtle Vices ofthe "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1964); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1959).
73. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH-THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS (1962).
74. In the pure Lockean sense, a "self-evident truth" was an uncontrovertible proposition: "The
mind cannot but assent to such a proposition as infallibly true, as soon as it understands the terms." 2
LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 227 (Fraser ed. 1894).
75. The problem largely arises because the Court, in attempting to sustain an equilibrium
between the mutually exclusive notions of mandatory jurisdiction and federalism's regard for the
proper allocation of spheres of influence to state and federal governments, has undertaken not only an
impossible task but also one beyond its authority. See Fischer, Institutional Competence: Some
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for us to examine whether or not the doctrine of mandatoryjurisdiction-
a doctrine that served courts well in the formative period of the Republic-
is a viable, utilitarian doctrine in an era when federal courts are called upon
76 77 7to run penal systems, school systems, mental hospitals,78 and generally
project an increasingly pervasive and visible influence over the way we are
as a political society.
III. THE VALUE OF ALLOWING FEDERAL COURTS TO DECLINE TO EXERCISE
JURISDICTION VALIDLY CONFERRED
"To pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque structure is more likely
simply to upset its Rresent balance between adverse interests than to establish
a rational edifice."
Justice Jackson's observation was a sage one. Simply to point out the
deficiencies of a past practice and argue for its elimination may, for the
long-term, do more harm than good. Legal doctrines do not exist in
isolation; rather, they tend to affect aligned and tangential doctrines; they
give rise to expectations regarding the course law will likely take, and tend
ultimately to define the relation that comes to exist between man and law.
Hence, while the doctrine of mandatory jurisdiction is of suspect origins,
many legal scholars have come to identify the doctrine as having a central
place in American constitutional jurisprudence. 80 We thus should reject
continued adherence to the doctrine, or pretensions of adherence, only if
we can state that on average we will be better off, that the benefits derived
from rejecting continued allegiance to the concept of mandatory jurisdic-
tion will outweigh the costs incurred by rejection.8'
A. Values and Costs of the System of Mandatory Jurisdiction
The doctrine of mandatory jurisdiction is a procedural device. As
Reflections on Judicial Activism in the Realm of Forum Allocation between State and Federal Courts,
34 U. MIAI L. REv. 175 (1980).
76. Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
77. See, e.g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 409 F. Supp. 1141 (D. Mass. 1975); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401
F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975).
78. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 and 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), enforcing 325
F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), modified on appeal sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th
Cir. 1974).
79. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948) (Jackson, J.).
80. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1(1959).
81. Adherence to the doctrine of mandatory jurisdiction does have some utility. First, by
retaining correspondence to the doctrinal formulations of past judges, the acceptability of judicial
decision-making is to some extent enhanced since supporters of such a function can point to the
impersonality of such a mode of decisionmaking and "their reasoned foundation, as manifested both
by the respect accorded to them by successor judges and by their staying power." See H. HART & A.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 589 (1958).
Hart and Sacks further pointed to another valid reason for adherence to a doctrine whose deficiencies
can be cured only at great cost to the system itself: "The necessity, considering the amorphous nature of
the limits upon judicial power and the usual absence of an effective political check at the ballot box,
that judges be subject to the discipline and the restraint of an obligation to build upon the prior law in a
fashion which can withstand the test of professional criticism." Id.
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such, viewed from an instrumentalist perspective, we ought to ask what
values of our procedural system are enhanced by the doctrine of manda-
tory jurisdiction.82
Procedure, as part of a larger system of law, can be thought of as an
attempt to advance a series of overlapping, and at times mutually exclu-
sive, ends-ends which fall into three generic categories. First, procedure
strives to realize those ends or values that tend to define individuals as
persons deserving respect before the law. These values, which can be
grouped together as "humanity" values, include procedural acknowledge-
ment of equality, fulfillment of expectations, sense of participation in the
adjudication process, and respect for human dignity. 83 The second cate-
gory is deterrence oriented. Here procedure is structured to induce individ-
uals to conform to certain desired modes of behavior.8 4 The third category
involves utilitarian values that allow a court to function effectively and
economically within the confines of whatever resources a society chooses
to allocate to its system of legal adjudication.85
82. This view of the doctrine of mandatory jurisdiction is purely instrumentalist. Instrumental-
ism looks at the procedural system as simply a mechanism, as the means, so to speak, by which certain
societal goals (ends) are achieved. Although instrumentalism may have a normative component (the
means chosen may violate some independent societal norm such as a ban against torture to achieve
confessions), instrumentalism is most characteristically evaluated by assessing how well certain
societal goals are achieved (result orientation). Accordingly, emphasis is often placed upon the worth
of the goals themselves as the measure of the procedural system created to implement those goals.
83. See Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's
Rights, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1172-75; Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Values,
44 U. Cm. L. REV. 28 (1976). Thus, Mashaw notes:
Yet the popular moral presupposition of individual dignity, and its political counterpart,
self-determination, persist. State coercion must be legitimized, not only by acceptable
substantive policies, but also by political processes that respond to a democratic morality's
demand for participation in decisions affecting individual and group interests. At the level of
individual administrative decisions this demand appears in both the layman's and the
lawyer's language as the right to a "hearing" or "to be heard," normally meaning orally and in
person. To accord an individual less when his property or status is at stake requiresjustifica-
tion, not only because he might contribute to accurate determinations, but also because a lack
of personal participation causes alienation and a loss of that dignity and self-respect that
society properly deems independently valuable.
Id. at 49-50 (footnotes omitted).
84. See Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's
Rights, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1175-76: "Litigation is often . . . viewed as a process, or part of a
process, for constraining all agents in society to the performance of duties and obligations imposed
with a view to social welfare." Deterrence values may also be somewhat more functional as, for
example, avoidance of civil jury trials by rigorous judicial insistence upon technical compliance with
the formal requirements for making the jury demand. See Devitt, Federal Civil Jury Trials Shouldbe
Abolished, 60 A.B.A.J. 570 (1974) (jury trials are too expensive a means of deciding civil cases: the best
available solution is to discourage the exercise of the right to jury trial). See generally P. CARRINGTON
& B. BABCOCK, CIVIL PROCEDURE, CASES AND COMMENTS ON THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 215-16
(2d ed. 1977).
85. See Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973). Compare White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay
Even More, 1973 Wis. L. RaV. 503,521 (estimated cost of nationwide substitution of replevin for self-
help repossession placed at $143 million), with Dauer & Gilhool, The Economics of Constitutionalized
Repossession: A Critique for Professor Johnson, and a Partial Reply, 47 S. CAL. L. RaV. 116, 147-49
(1973) (the judicial process may have a benign effect on the process of work-out or settlement, it may
deter wrongful conduct by creditors, and hence avoid the need for judicial intervention altogether,
and it might assure better resale prices thus avoiding the institution of deficiency actions).
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Insofar as humanity values are concerned, only a weak case can be
made that they are enhanced by the doctrine of mandatory jurisdiction.
The argument that certain procedures enhance these values speaks, if at all,
to the argument that some formal judicialization of a process ought to be
undertaken. For example, the question may be posited whether creditors
upon a debtor's default ought to be allowed to use self-help to obtain
possession over chattels in which they hold a security interest, or whether
creditors ought to be required to use pre-established, judicially supervised
procedures. The argument, however, always turns upon the advisability of
recourse to courts in general, not to particular courts.8 6 Hence, to accept
that proceduralization of a process is appropriate because certain humani-
ty values are enhanced does not lead one to conclude that access to a
particular court is a necessarily included component of that decision.
Indeed, unless it can be shown that an alternative court is institutionally
unable to recognize the humanity values that proceduralization seeks to
enhance and that it consequently would not recognize them, or that only
one judicial system exists to which proceduralization can be referenced,
there is no compelling connection between humanity values and the
doctrine of mandatory jurisdiction. Humanity values simply demand that
courts recognize those values in exercising adjudicatory functions, not that
all courts must provide access as an incident of their existence. It is only
when no alternative court exists for the recognition of humanity values
that a utilitarian claim can be advanced that access to a particular court
should be guaranteed8 7
The second category, deterrence values, is likewise of no consequence
to the argument in favor of mandatory jurisdiction. To suggest that a court
must exercise jurisdiction to enhance deterrence values amounts to an
argument that the alternative of litigating in another court is socially
undesirable and hence is to be deterred and discouraged. The short answer
to that assertion is that it has rarely been the policy of the American
judicial system to discourage litigation in alternative forums that have
been vested with concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
86. A similar argument could be made by an individual-rights theorist who might assert that a
judicial forum must be provided in repossession cases because a failure to do so would deprive a litigant
of a preexisting right, such as the protection against nonconsensual taking of property without a prior
hearing, which the political system must guarantee even at the expense of social and economic policies
that inure to the benefit of the majority. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTs SERIOUSLY 197-204(1977).
Acceptance of the rights thesis does not appear to require that "rights" be adjudicated and determined
in one particular court as opposed to another court. The critical requirement is that the manner and
mode of adjudication be consistent with those principles which properly shape the essential judicial
function. Id. at 110-23. It appears that any institution that satisfied that criterion could properly pass
upon and determine individual rights.
87. This is reflected in the Supreme Court's unwillingness to exercise collateral review unless
there is an error in the proceedings that suggests a miscarriage of justice or adversely affects the
accuracy of the decision-making process. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See also Fischer,
Institutional Competence: Some Reflections on Judicial Activism in the Realm of Forum Allocation
betwieen State and Federal Courts, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 175, 181 (1980).
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dispute.8' Indeed, even when qualifications to this principle have been
recognized, those qualifications are not really discretionary qualifications
to the exercise of jurisdiction by a particular court, but are examples of
grants or reservations of exclusive jurisdiction by which one court is vested
with sole authority to adjudicate the matter at issue. 89 Thus, it can be said
that it has never been the accepted policy of American courts to discourage
access to alternative forums.90 It has, of course, been the policy of many
American courts to discourage access to that court;91 yet, problems of self-
denial are what raise the mandatory jurisdiction problem. Policies that
flout the argument of mandatory jurisdiction, do not, by their terms,
establish the validity of the argument. At best they amount to a tautol-
ogy.
92
It is only utilitarian values that truly affect our continued adherence to
a doctrine of mandatory jurisdiction. Insofar as these utilitarian values are
concerned, the case for mandatory or discretionary jurisdiction is influ-
88. See Fischer, Institutional Competence: Some Reflections on Judicial Activism in the Realm
of Forum Allocation between State and Federal Courts, 34 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 175 (1980). But see note
89 infra. While the policy of American courts has not been to discourage access to other forums, courts
generally have discouraged multiple litigation in different forums even though each forum was
technically open to the litigants. See note 70 supra. Because of difficulties functionally and pragmati-
cally encountered in trying to induce another forum to relinquish jurisdiction asserted, constraints
generally have been self-imposed. See notes 63-78 and accompanying text supra. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1976) (anti-injunction statute prohibiting federal courts from enjoining state court proceedings except
under specified circumstances); Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Equity Decrees, 42 IowA L.
REv. 183 (1957) (noting that courts generally have ignored sister-state injunctions against further
proceedings in the forum and have permitted the action to proceed).
89. See, e.g., In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890). "The whole subject of the domestic relations of
husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United
States." Id at 593-94 (dictum). See Sutton v. English, 246 U.S. 199 (1918).
The present suit being, in an essential feature a suit to annul the will of Mary Jean Hubbard,
and a proceeding of this character being. . . .merely supplemental to the proceedings for
probate of the will and cognizable only by the probate court, it follows from what we have
said that the controversy is not within the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.
Id. at 208. See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1186-92 (2d ed. 1973).
90. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 686 (2d ed. 1973):
The Supreme Court early and consistently held that an agreement by a foreign corporation,
exacted by a state statute, not to remove to a federal court any case brought against it in a
state court was ineffectual to oust jurisdiction when the corporation later removed a case in
defiance of the agreement. The agreement was condemned independently of the statute on the
basis of the common law doctrine that "agreements in advance to oust the courts of the
jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void." And it was held that the statute gave the
agreement no added force, since the state was without power to impose conditions repugnant
to the Constitution and laws of the United States.
91. Id. This has resulted in the genesis of such access constraining doctrines as exhaustion and
abstention. See notes 62-70 supra.
92. A tautological statement is a purported proof that is true only by virtue of its "form," not by
virtue of its substance. In this case the tautology is as follows:
Legal systems that do not freely allow access to their courts abridge the right of mandatory
jurisdiction and hence constitute a wrong or injury to society. That wrong ought to be
deterred. Thus, mandatory jurisdiction is a doctrine whose justification is established
through a conscious decision to avoid infliction of wrong or injury upon society.
The vice of the above statement is that it assumes what it purports to prove-that a "right" to
mandatory jurisdiction exists and is of "benefit" to society.
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enced by the extent to which a legal system elects to avoid the diseconomies
occasioned by duplicative litigation or seeks to warrant its legitimacy by
enhancing the perception that it is an impartial, neutral, decision-making
tribunal. Utilitarian values can also be asserted as justifying a system of
discretionary jurisdiction either because the case for mandatory jurisdic-
tion is not established on the merits or because that case, however made, is
outweighed by the values that a court believes underlie a doctrine of
discretionary jurisdiction. These latter values include self-preservation as
an effective decision-making tribunal and the avoidance of premature
involvement in controversies that may be better resolved if allowed to play
a little longer before final judicial decisionmaking takes place.
One further consideration is important but will not be specifically
addressed in this Article. This latter point involves those substantive values
that a legislature may wish to advance by confining judicial adjudications
before one particular system of courts. Thus, it may be desirable that a
particular tribunal develop expertise in the statutory scheme created by
Congress,93 that a litigant be allowed or not be allowed to forum shop,94
that the scheme for political reasons favor one type of claimant over
another,95 or that the application and enforcement of the new statutory
scheme be readily subject to legislative review for alteration, modification,
or revocation. The list is certainly not exclusive. Yet, it does articulate a set
of criteria for which a doctrine of mandatory jurisdiction may prove
particularly helpful by confining litigation within those tribunals which are
perceived as being most responsive to implementing the substantive goals
of legislation. In essence, a doctrine of mandatory jurisdiction prevents a
court from sidestepping those duties that are properly assigned to it, and
hence incrementally aids in the achievement of the larger legislative ends.
Nevertheless, since these consequential values are solely of legislative
concern, 96 they will not be addressed here nor will the doctrine of manda-
tory jurisdiction, which is essentially a judge-made rule, be addressed in
terms of specific, substantive, statutory concerns.
B. The Relation Between "Principled" Decisionmaking and
Jurisdiction Declination in American Jurisprudence
The ultimate acceptance or rejection of the doctrine of mandatory
93. See e.g., Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 92-210 § 211, 85 STAT. 748-50
(1971), as amended by, Credit Control Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1970), Emergency Petroleum Allocation
Act of 1931, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 STAT. 628 (1973), 15 U.S.C. § 6201 et. seq. (1975).
94. See Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1285
(1977).
95. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 569 (2d ed. 1973). "There is some historical evidence to support the conclusion that
Congressional policy favored jury trials in F.E.L.A. cases, and possibly for plaintiff-favoring reasons,
but it is far from conclusive." Id. (citations omitted). See also Hill, Substance and Procedure in State
FELA Actions-The Converse of the Erie Problem?, 17 OHIO ST. L. J. 384, 397 (1956) (noting the
premise that juries tend strongly to favor injured railroad workers).
96. See Fischer, Institutional Competence: Some Reflections on JudicialActivism in the Realm
of Forum Allocation between State and Federal Courts, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 175 (1980).
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jurisdiction rests upon considerations relevant to our own time and present
circumstances. A utilitarian argument of potential merit has been noted
that accepts the doctrine of mandatory jurisdiction as an aspect of a
judicial system's internal and external quest for acceptability. Sometimes,
however, the argument is cast in normative terms. If a particular type or
category of case is traditionally heard by courts under a jurisdictional
grant, the courts would be operating outside the norm of principle were
they to decline to entertain a particularly difficult case for reasons "uni-
que" to that case, but otherwise falling within the general principles
articulated in an earlier case or series of cases. Since "principled" decision-
making is treated as an essential feature of the judicial function, manda-
tory jurisdiction is the end product of a "principled" decisionmaking that
requires of courts that they render holdings that are consistent and of
general application. So important becomes the ideal of "principle" that in
most instances the question of mandatory jurisdiction is reduced in the
eyes of its defenders and detractors to a question regarding the legitimacy
of judicial review itself.98
This argument of principled decisionmaking was presented and
contrasted in an illuminating trilogy of constitutional commentaries au-
thored by Professors Wechsler, Bickel, and Gunther.99 Wechsler took the
position that the Constitution required that constitutional adjudications
proceed on a basis of principle. This was not, according to Wechsler,
simply to say that like cases be decided in a similar manner, but rather that
as a mode of legal reasoning, the holding of a case of constitutional
magnitude should be transcendental.' 0 Wechsler tied the doctrine, insofar
as applicable here, to the notion that the decision whether to accept or
reject jurisdiction be principled, a position critiqued by Bickel but de-
fended by Gunther. A problem involving the proper range of factors that
could be considered in making the decision had developed as the federal
courts took an increasingly active role in political controversies, a role that
exposed the myth that cases and controversies decided by the federal
courts under the mandate of Marbury v. Madison were private disputes,
nothing more.'0 '
Wechsler asserted that judicial review was legitimate for the very
97. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15, 19
(1959).
98. Id.
99. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARv. L. REV.
40 (1961); Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues" - A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1964); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959).
100. Weehsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 15, 19
(1959).
101. There is an argument that the thesis of neutral principles represented, in part, a movement
away from a rigorous philosophy of legal realism because it gave rise to an anomalous relationship
between judicial freedom and democratic government. This, in turn, produced a revisionism that
seemed to find articulation in Wechsler's defense of judicial review through his argument of principle.
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reason that judicial decisionmaking was argued as being "principled" as
opposed to policy oriented.102 Wechsler argued that courts, in exercising
the constitutional mandate of judicial review, should decide cases by a
standard that was not tied to a contemporaneous social goal, i.e., policy;
rather, the proper standard was a transcendental principle, consistently
applied. The essence of judicial decisionmaking was not the result reached
in a case or series of cases, but rather that process by which the result was
reached. It was the requirement that judicial decisionmaking conform to
this mode of reasoning that justified judicial review and distinguished
judicial review from legislative acts. 0 3
Unfortunately, Wechsler's argument seemed to partake of two diver-
gent factors. First, the principle of consistency seemed to be just that-a
demand that like cases be decided alike. In this vein, the principle did not
materially differ, Wechsler's protestations to the contrary, from the doc-
trine of stare decisis. To say that like cases should be decided in a like
manner would be a poor prop upon which to affix the doctrine of judicial
review. Uniformity and certainty in the application of law, while compo-
nents of procedural fairness, do not provide, of themselves, normative
support for judicial supremacy in constitutional adjudications. What did
provide support was the added qualification that the court would, in
accordance with a principle of consistency, review the controversy against
neutral principles without regard for the result(s) of the particular case. 04
Thus, for example, Wechsler argued that the desegregation case, Brown v.
Board of Education,0 5 should have been decided by reference to the
neutral principle of freedom of association rather than the policy factors of
societal and individual deprivation expressed by the Court.
0 6
Nevertheless, the attempt to justify the current state of judicial deci-
sionmaking on the basis of neutral principles is impossible. That courts
decide cases on the basis of, or at least with some consideration to,
principle may be conceded; yet this does not amount to a concession that
such principles are "neutral" in any sense of the term. The mode ofjudicial
decisonmaking currently exercised demands that the principle asserted
provide some guidance concerning the correct or most correct resolution
of the problem. A simple example will demonstrate this point. In Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 10 7 the New York Court of Appeals was faced
102. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15-20
(1959). As a corollary, at least in the field of constitutional judicial review, when judicial decision-
making was not "principled," it was not legitimate. This corollary is necessarily implied, although it
was not developed by Wechsler.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
106. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31-34
(1959). See Friendly The Courts and SocialPolicy: Substance and Procedure, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 21,
29-32 (1978).
107. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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with a question whether to extend liability in tort to the manufacturer for
the negligent construction of an automobile in favor of one not in privity of
contract. In holding that liability did so extend, the court was required to
account for a series of earlier precedents as part of the resolution of the
exact question before the court. Justice Cardozo, for the court, explicitly
noted:
The foundations of this branch of the law, at least in this state, were laid in
Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455. A poison was falsely
labeled. The sale was made to a druggist, who in turn sold to a customer. The
customer recovered damages from the seller who affixed the label. "The
defendant's negligence," it was said, "put human life in imminent danger." A
poison, falsely labeled, is likely to injure any one who gets it. Because the
danger is to be foreseen, there is a duty to avoid the injury. 08
Having articulated the principle, Cardozo now proceeded to the gist of the
judicial function-application of the principle to the facts of the case.
Cases were cited by way of illustration in which manufacturers were not
subject to any duty irrespective of contract. The distinction was said to be that
their conduct, though negligent, was not likely to result in injury to anyone
except the purchaser. We are not required to say whether the chance of injury
was always as remote as the distinction assumes. Some of the illustrations
might be rejected today. The principle of the distinction is, for present
purposes, the important thing. Thomas v. Winchester became quickly a
landmark of the law. In the application of its principle there may, at times,
have been uncertainty or even error. There has never in this state been doubt
or disavowal of the principle itself.109
It should be noted that the this reference to "the principle of the
distinction" does not constitute a rule of law in the general sense of the
term. 10 To say that "[b]ecause the danger is to be foreseen there is a duty to
avoid the injury," does not resolve the case, but it does point the way. It is,
moreover, a standard of consistency-a principle that allowed the court to
demonstrate a commonality with prior decisions of a similar nature.
Once some guidance is provided, however, the principle loses it
neutrality. It no longer defines the controversy; it points toward its proper
108. Id. at 385, 1II N.E. at 1051.
109. Id.
110. I would here identify a rule as a legitimized command that provides, if applicable, clear
guidance to the resolution of a particular dispute. See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUsLY 46 (1977); Richards, Rules, Policies and Neutral Principles: The Search for Legitimacy in
Common Law and Constitutional Adjudication, 11 GA. L. REv. 1069,1089-96 (1977). Legalprinciples
seem to defy systematic regimentation. The best one is often a play on Justice Stewart's "I know it when
I see it" statement. Principle, as opposed to rule, finds articulation as the result of a process of legal
reasoning, Richards, Rules, Policies and Neutral Principles: The Search for Legitimacy in Common
Law and Constitutional Adjudication, I 1 GA. L. REv. 1069, 1093 (1977), that, unfortunately, justifies
itself as based upon principle. Indeed, the attempt to define principle seems to be one of Dworkin's
major achievements. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, ch. 2-3 (1977). Nevertheless,
proper characterization of a policy as a rule or principle is more the result of an understanding of the
underlying process of adjudication than the mere application of labels.
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resolution.' The concept of "neutral principles" thus appears not only to
be internally inconsistent," 2 but extraneous to the manner and mode by
which courts exercise the judicial function. Principles by their nature must
lose their neutrality, indeed if they ever have any, once application of the
principle is sought. In reality, there is little functional difference between
rules and principles, save for their breadth-rules being more constrained
but more certain, in their application than principles. Yet, with both rules
and principles it is not enough simply to note their existence. Rather, we
must ask two further questions: first, why have rules or principles; second,
assuming we should have rules or principles or both, which rules or princi-
ples should we apply to the case at hand? Yet, as soon as we attempt to an-
swer either question, our attempt to achieve objective neutrality is lost.
Rather, we seek to impart by reliance upon "neutral" principles the aura of
objectivity, and hence infallibility, to what can only be subjective, intuitive
value assessments.
Courts should be required to articulate frankly and openly the con-
flicting policies and values that are at issue in the particular case or will be
affected as a consequence of the particular case. Once this point is reached,
however, neutral principles take us down a path that is primrose but little
else. Consistency of reasoning asks no more of judges than of common
man; but it does demand that ajudge investigate all reasonable possibilities
and evaluate the product of all such investigations. Do we ask of anyone
that he do less in formulating his life judgments; if he does less, do we
excuse his failure to use common sense, logicality, and reasonableness to
solve life's problems? The concept of neutral principles in the end demands
of judges that they use common sense, a wise admonition, but one that
brings us only to the starting gate, not the finish line.
An even greater problem with "neutral principles," and a doctrine of
111. A truly neutral principle would perhaps be akin to the Court's statement in Angel v.
Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947), that "for purposes of diversity jurisdiction a federal court is, 'in effect,
only another court of the state.' . . . Id. at 187 (citations omitted). Such a principle possesses general
application while not purporting to influence resolution of the matter in favor of either litigant,
although reference of the case to a particular court or body of law for resolution does involve value-
laden preferences. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1052-53 (2d ed. 1973) (commenting upon reasons generally given for creation of
diversity jurisdiction). Thus, it is difficult to comprehend how any"neutral principles," few as they are,
could ever provide a sound foundation for the doctrine ofjudicial review. Their universe is too narrow
for the task assigned. See note 117 infra.
112. In the sense that to be a "principle" is to lose any claim to neutrality, see Richards, Rules,
Policies and Neutral Principles: The Search for Legitimacy in Common Law and Constitutional
Adjudication, 11 GA. L. REV. 1069, 1082-89 (1977). See also Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality
in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. Cm. L. REV. 661 (1960).
Neutrality, if it means anything, can refer only to the thought processes of identifiable human
beings. Principles cannot be neutral or biased or prejudiced-obviously. The choices that are
made by judges in constitutional cases always involve value consequences, thus making value
choice unavoidable. The principles which judges employ in projecting their choices to the
future, or in explaining them, must also refer to such value alternatives, if given empirical
reference. A principle might, in Professor Hart's term, be "durable," but only because enough
human beings want it to be so.
Id. at 664.
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judicial review predicated upon their existence, is the incompatibility
between "neutral principles" and the doctrine of judicial review. A grudg-
ing tolerance of judicial review will find expression in an uncompromising
requirement that courts decide cases in full conformity to requirements of
fully articulated principle. As recognized by Wechsler, the hard case will
often not be resolvable by reference to neutral principles. Thus, Wechsler
notes of Brown v. Board of Education that the only neutral principle
supportive of the decision was freedom of association." 3 That principle,
however, was itself compromised. The Court in essence held that blacks
were free to associate with whom they pleased, yet whites were not free to
associate according to their own desires. The absence of a neutral principle
would then argue against judicial intervention into the controversy. In-
deed, it is hard to conceive of many cases of constitutional magnitude that
would be subject to judicial review were courts limited to such formulas for
issue resolution.1 14 Of course, a principle may be designed that will seem to
suffice. For example, it might be argued, as Bickel did, that the desegrega-
tion case was susceptible to a principle outlawing all forms of racial
classification by the state. 1 5 But what supports treatment of such a
standard as a neutral principle? No court has ever treated such a standard
so unrelenting as the neutral principles standard would demand.' 16 Does
such a standard, any more than the concept of freedom of association,
satisfy Wechsler's criterion that the "principle" not favor either party to the
controversy? 17 Does it not suffer from the problem that to be truly neutral
it must, in essence, form the center of some consensus relative to the scope
and reach of the standard sought to be applied? Yet, if there is consensus,
there is no real controversy; if there is no consensus, the neutral principles
standard provides no guidance to a proper resolution of the controversy.
In the end, acceptance of a role for judicial decisionmaking of con-
stitutional dimension within the framework of a federal tripartite system
113. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1,34(1959).
114. It is just this realization that has caused modem supporters of a strong philosophy of
judicial review, such as Dworkin, to base their justification of the practice in terms of moral principles
that are value-laden as opposed to the neutral principles proposed by Wechsler.
115. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH-TE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS
57-58, 63, 69 (1962).
116. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Rostow, The Japanese Ameri-
can Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945). Recently, the question of racial discrimination has
undergone a subtle twist in legal emphasis. It is only those racial classifications that stigmatize,
disgrace, or shame that necessitate eradication under the equal protection clause. Such a principle
could not be deemed neutral since application of the principle would depend oncharacterization of the
classification as helpful or inimical to the interests of the classified group. See United Jewish Organiza-
tions v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 168-79 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring).
117. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. Rav. 1 (1959). It
might be urged that Wechsler's principle of association could be formulated into a"neutral principle".
Thus, it might be argued that freedom of association means the right to associate, not disassociate. Or
put another way, one would be required to associate with those who wanted to associate with him, even
if he did not want to associate with them. Such a formulation seems neutral; blacks must associate with
whites just as whites must associate with blacks. Yet, the neutrality is superficial. Ifrequiredassociation
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of government revolves around the system's willingness to perceive judicial
review as consistent with the goals and aspirations of our society. As noted
by Bishin:
But the only way in which it has been shown that judicial review is
undemocratic has been to point to the fact that it is so obviously a nonmajori-
tarian institution. It is not a principle of the American democracy, however,
that all decisionmaking must be by majoritarian agencies. Why, then, is not
judicial review-whose existence is at least hinted at in articles III and VI of
the Constitution and which concededly is supported by considerable legisla-
tive history-simply another one of the nonmajoritarian phenomena of
which the system partially consists?
To phrase it another way, if the United States is a democracy, as the
critics ofjudicial review and many others seem to assume, then those nonma-
joritarian elements which are an accepted part of the system are consistent
with democracy. In this sense, could it not be said, indeed, that they are
democratic? Similarly, ifjudicial review is an accepted part of the system, is it
not also consistent with democracy? Of course, it can be argued that judicial
review is not an accepted part of the system. But if this argument is made, it
must be supported by something other than the remark that it is not decision-
making by the majority's representatives. There must be something else
wrong with it.""
The acceptance of judicial review bespeaks, I believe, a popular
willingness to treat the function as consistent with the theory of democratic
institutions expressed by the Constitution. By the same token, judicial
review will only be tolerated so long as it remains in touch with the popular
willingness to accept it. To restrict courts in matters of constitutional
adjudications to "neutral principles" prevents the courts from assessing
societal needs as the political system matures. Moreover, it hinders the
courts in building a base of popular support by responding to societal
needs through the accommodation of conflicting interests. Emphasis upon
principle is misdirected and counterproductive. Recognizing that constitu-
tional adjudications are founded upon accommodations of policy presents
difficulties, not the least of which is disagreement with the result reached.
can be seen as neutral, it is only in a totally abstract sense, divorced from all reality and human values.
Required association is itself a policy or value. To treat it as a "neutral principle" implies that a
consensus exists that the principle is acceptable. Yet, the dispute itself is over the acceptability of the
principle. As perceptively pointed out by Miller and Howell:
The position taken by Hart and Wechsler is based on a view of life and the social process in
which litigants (and others) are in agreement on the basic essentials-the goal values-and all
that remains is the settlement of preferred ways to reach those ends. Put another way, their
position is bottomed on a theory of a fundamental harmony of interests of all members of the
American community. But that is precisely what may not be present in most important
constitutional litigation, such as racial relations, where disagreement is over ends or goals and
not the means or tactics to attain them; the administration of the criminal law, where an anti-
social being is jousting with something called society; and in many of the civil liberty cases,
where again the disagreement is over fundamentals.
Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 27 U. CHi. L. Rav. 661,687,(1960).
118. Bishin, Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099, 1109 (1977)
(footnotes omitted).
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However, to ignore policy is to sterilize the institution by emphasizing the
veneer instead of the quality of wood underneath.
Constitutional review should not be treated as different in kind from
other exercises of the judicial function. In essence, once judicial review is
accepted, its application does not differ according to the nature of the case
before the court. If courts articulate policy in nonconstitutional cases, as
they obviously do, then courts in exercising the judicial function in consti-
tutional cases should be able to do likewise. 119 Of course, the policy
considerations in constitutional cases will differ from the tenor of such
considerations in nonconstitutional decisions; however, that is merely a
factor for the court to consider-not a reason to exclude policy from
constitutional cases. In effect, the question becomes, what is the role of
policy in the exercise of the judicial function?
In the realm ofjudicial decisionmaking outside the arena of constitu-
tional adjudications, insistence upon principle is not so compulsive. In-
deed, it is recognized that considerations of policy play a primary role. As
observed by Justice Shaefer:
Baldly stated, I suppose that whether a precedent will be modified depends on
whether the-policies which underlie the proposed rule are strong enough to
outweigh both the policies which support the existing rule and the disadvan-
tages of making a change. The problem is not different in kind from that
which is involved in the decisions of other regulatory organs, private or
public. In the case of any one decision we may be able to explain why this or
that consideration has prevailed, but it is hardly possible to state a general
formula which will describe the process in its totality. 20
In applying these considerations, the court will no doubt search for a
unifying principle-as did the court in MacPherson; however, the disposi-
tion of the case will be determined, controlled, and directed by the impact
that policy has upon the principle understood by the court to be common
to the prior cases. A principle such as that extracted in MacPherson,
"because the danger is to be foreseen, there is a duty to avoid the injury,"
divorced from policy, can support a case such as Winterbottom v.
Wright12' as well as Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.
122
119. The argument is offered that the texture ofconstitutional adjudication is different than pure
private dispute resolution because in the former the judiciary must begin with an existing value choice
and decide whether that value choice is prohibited by the Constitution. See Mueller and Schwartz, The
Principle of Neutral Principles, 7 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 571, 585 (1960). The distinction proposed,
however, has no material impact upon the scope of judicial review in constitutional adjudications. A
court in a simple civil action to determine whether a contract has been breached starts from a premise
that a party has made a value choice, i.e., am I bound by the contract terms, and the court must now
determine whether that choice was prohibited by the law of contract. If a difference exists between the
institutional role of the courts in constitutional as opposed to nonconstitutional adjudications, it is a
difference measured only in degree, not in kind. See Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition,
82 YALE L.J. 227, 248-49 (1972).
120. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 3, 12, (1966).
121. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842) (manufacturer not liable to one not in privity of contract for
injuries resulting from use of manufacturer's product).
122. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (manufacturer liable to user of
defective product without regard to privity of contract).
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Principle, as everything else in life, makes no sense if viewed in
isolation. When, however, courts assert their role as constitutional guard-
ian, the concept of policy is placed in the closet and principle is brought out
in its place as though through this metamorphosis institutional credibility
would be established. We seem to be able to recognize that courts do make
policy within and without constitutional adjudications. Yet, as with the
Blackstonian notion that courts did not so much make law as declare it, we
seem unable or unwilling to accept the inevitable realization that courts,
and the Supreme Court in particular, establish policy through their inter-
pretation and explication of constitutional doctrine. Accepted as such, the
fuss over a court establishing policy seems much ado about nothing. If
policy will, as it must, be called upon to give color to the picture ofjudicial
review so that it becomes recognizable, why not accept the role of policy
and view the institution of judicial review in its true, as opposed to its
idealized, light. In the end, if so illuminated, judicial review proves to be
incompatible with the theory of democratic institutions, then so be it.
Within a system of checks and balances founded upon suspicion and
distrust of aggrandizement of government power, however, we in all
likelihood have less to fear from the judiciary than the other branches of
government. The judiciary has only the power to persuade; it lacks com-
pletely any power to enforce. So viewed it seems rather foolish to continue
insisting that we ignore what we know the courts are doing, and must do, if
they are to continue to operate as effective media for the resolution of
conflict between men and government.
Now viewed in the above light, principle certainly has a role in the
justification of judicial review. It serves as a mechanism by which courts
are required to demonstrate a meaningful connection with like decisions in
the past. Principle, as here envisioned, is not a standard representing a
moral or natural right; rather, it is a means of identifying the process by
which a judicial decision is made. 123 It is reflective of an intuitive require-
ment that change effected through the judiciary ought to be incremental
and gradual. As noted by former Chief Justice Traynor of the California
Supreme Court:
The very caution of the judicial process offers the best of reasons for
confidence in the recurring reformation ofjudicial rules. A decision that has
not suffered premature birth has a reduced risk of premature death. Insofar as
a court remains uncommitted to unduly wide implications of a decision, it
gains time to inform itself further through succeeding cases. It is then better
situated to retreat or advance with little disturbance to the evolutionary
course of the law and to those who act in reliance upon judicial decisions.
After a generation of experience, I believe that the primary obligation of
a judge, at once conservative and creative, is to keep the inevitable evolution
of the law on a rational course. Twenty years ago I wrote that the danger was
123. The process is described in Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 376
(1946).
1980]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
not that judges would exceed their power, but that they would fall short of
their obligation. Better the active pilot, sensitive to the currents of the river,
than an armchair captain hidebound to a dated rulebook. The pilot who
knows the river, however, must above all know the moorings well. If he
disengages his bark from one, he must be certain he can reach another.
12 4
C. The Extent and Limit of Mandatory Jurisdiction
The preceding discussion of the role of principle and policy in the
explication of judicial decisionmaking evidences that the doctrine of
mandatory jurisdiction is not tied to the judicial function by an umbilical
cord of principle any more than the fundamental judicial function of
judicial review in constitutional adjudications. Rather, if the doctrine of
mandatory jurisdiction is to be tied to the inherent judicial function, it is to
be accomplished because it is determined that those benefits realized by
adoption of a policy outweigh whatever costs are sustained. Hence, we
return to the earlier formulation of the defined policies or values that
underlie the argument for the acceptance or rejection of the doctrine of
mandatory jurisdiction.
1. Avoiding Premature Expressions of Positions on Matters of Exigent
Political Policy
The common law doctrine of stare decisis is not the formidable edifice
that it once was. Nonetheless, it remains a structural barrier to flippant
overruling of decided cases. The preferred treatment is to put inconvenient
old rulings aside as factually distinguishable. The wealth of potential
factual distinctions marks every decision as a candidate for relegation to a
position of inconsequence in the caselaw. This is not to say, however, that
the overruling of precedent is a common occurrence. On the other hand, it
is not an uncommon occurrence. 125 It must be remembered, however, that
adoption of a particular legal position or policy will be more difficult when
an ill-conceived decision, particularly a recent decision, stands in the way,
preventing the court from writing on a clean slate.
A judge must elucidate painstakingly a decision that involves the overruling
of an earlier one. He soon learns that a bad precedent is easier said than
undone. If the discarded precedent was intrinsically unsound from the outset,
he must undertake an exposition of the injustice of [sic] confusion it engen-
dered. When he thus speaks out, his words may serve also to quicken public
respect for the law as an instrument of justice. If the discarded decision has
merely become obsolete, he must also specify how it fails to mesh with
contemporary laws or with other judicial rules or statutes. 26
In this sense, it can be argued that, for a court which serves as an ultimate
decision-maker, the consequences of refusing to acknowledge a privilege
124. Traynor, The Limits of Judicial Creativity, 63 IowA L. REv. 1, 7 (1977).
125. Jones, Our Uncommon Common Law, 42 TENN. L. REv. 443, 457 (1975).
126. Traynor, The Limits of Judicial Creativity, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1, 9 (1977).
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to decline to exercise jurisdiction can be disadvantageous. The court may
be faced with an inappropriate vehicle to articulate policy. The facts may
be insufficiently developed to allow the court to obtain a glimmer of the
probable path the doctrine will take. The court may prefer to allow other
courts and commentators free leave to explore possible alternatives before
the long-run consequences of a "freezing" of doctrine occurs. For all these
reasons, the court may perceive that while the case is ripe in the constitu-
tional sense, the time is not. That judicial diffidence is sound because in the
long run it will facilitate the development of a coherent, sensible, and stable
body of law.
If a limited doctrine of discretionary power to decline to assert
jurisdiction can be perceived as sound for the reasons stated above, it can
only be so if two important qualifications are noted. First, this doctrine of
discretionary power can only be applied to a court from which no review
can be taken. It is only when a court sits as a highest court that the benefits
of deferral can be realized. Indeed, to extend the doctrine of discretionary
jurisdiction to lower courts would be counterproductive, since the higher
court would lose the benefit of the sharpening of issues that is occasioned
by the lower court decisions. Moreover, the benefits realized from deferral
should not be obtained at the cost of denying the litigants any forum
whatsoever. This holds true even when the decision rendered in the interim
will eventually be determined to be incorrect. Making available to the
litigants a forum in which to resolve their dispute advances definite social
goals such as repose, peace, and finality to civil disputes, even at the cost of
submerging for the moment the goal of "correct" decisions. 127 Second, it
goes too far to suggest that a discretionary power to accept or reject a case
may be implemented in an unprincipled fashion. To avoid decision-
making through the use of unprincipled means places courts, as institu-
tions, in disrepute. No practice so sorely injures the political process as a
lack of candor when governmental actions are explained to the public. In
an era of mass dissemination of commentary and criticism, the subterfuge
is not hidden for long. The unfortunate result is that a lack of candor will
generally be perceived as evidence of deviousness. A decision not to decide,
which in reality rests upon an unreadiness to cross unsailed shoals but
which is disposed of by having a justiciability standard do yeoman's work,
will be perceived as resting upon shameful decisions by the court not to
recognize certain rights. The solution, however, is not to require that the
court provide a forum whenever a litigant demands; rather, reality requires
that we recognize the right to be prudent. Reflection is a slow process; it
127. Whether or not a particular lower court should exercise jurisdiction turns essentially upon
the reasons for which access to particular tribunals was created. See Fischer, Institutional Competence:
Some Reflections on Judicial Activism in the Realm of Forum Allocation between State and Federal
Courts, 34 U. MIAII L. REv. 175 (1980). Thus, for example, if Congress wished in creating a
jurisdiction statute to confer upon litigants a "right" of immediate access to federal courts, that right
ought to be respected and access correspondingly afforded no matter what the status of pending actions
in state courts. Id. at 198-203.
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would seem appropriate that in the exceptional circumstances described
above courts be allowed to avail themselves of the benefits that critical
reflection engenders. To allow a supreme court to avoid rendering a
decision when it is institutionally unsure of the proper resolution does not
result in an ousting of a class of litigants from a judicial forum. The
litigants, in such cases, are only denied review in front of a particular court
whose decision, ifjurisdiction were accepted, would have repercussions far
beyond the private dispute posted by the litigants. It is important that we
allow sufficient leeway to permit sound principles to germinate and not by
a too hasty inclination to tread uncharted paths which "confuse the pro-
duction of ideas with their distribution.' ' 128 On the other hand, when a
court is not candid, when it relies upon unarticulated standards to avoid a
decision, the equivalence of a decision on the merits does take place since
the principle of consistency will apply to this latter situation but not the
former. 29 Thus, it is one thing for a court to state it is not yet prepared to
decide the issue; it is quite another for the court to accomplish the same re-
sult by a disingenuous analysis of constitutional and statutory grants of
jurisdiction. Simply because a court is unsure of the best resolution of a
problem at one point in time does not give rise to the expectation that it will
be similarly uncertain at another point in time after a suitable period for
critical reflection and inquiry has elapsed. The availment of such a reflec-
tive process is not unprincipled, nor does it amount to judicial sanctioning
of illegal practices since the court is presently unsure of the proper identifi-
cation of legal rights and remedies.
2. Judicial Self Preservation as an Effective Political Entity
Courts in general, and supreme courts in particular, are powerful only
as long as they can persuade the public and the coordinate branches of
government to respect their judgments. This need to instill and maintain
public confidence in the judiciary is a point that unfortunately is all too
often ignored or disregarded.
The perceived benefits of self-preservation strategy have often under-
pinned significant judicial lawmaking. Perhaps the foremost example is
the Supreme Court's whittling down of the "arising under" language in the
general federal question jurisdiction granted by Congress to the federal
courts. That the Court's limiting construction of the "arising under"
language was encouraged by the caseload burdens occasioned by an open-
textured jurisdictional grant is beyond doubt, as is the realization that the
lines between actions properly commenced in state courts as opposed to
federal courts have been largely beneficial to the cooperative federalism
128. Frankfurter, The Conditions for, and the Aims and Methods of Legal Research, 15 IOWA
L. REV. 129, 135 (1930).
129. See Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1964).
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that is the mainspring of our political system. 130 Yet, the self-preservation
doctrine is often suggested in terms that are radically different in kind from
the forum allocation decisions that shaped our present doctrine of federal
question jurisdiction. The tenor of the argument presented by Professor
Bickel is, perhaps, reflective of the strain of self-preservation arguments
that one suspects underlies most arguments in favor of discretionary power
to decline to exercise jurisdiction. Professor Bickel suggested that even if
the Court believed that a program, for example, affirmative action, was
unconstitutional, the Court could legitimately refuse to decide the case if it
were also of the belief that the unconstitutional action was socially benefi-
cial. 13 1 While the notion that a court would knowingly contenance an
unconstitutional result cannot be accepted, the problem of decision avoid-
ance, where avoidance itself is seen as socially beneficial, deserves further
consideration.
The proposition that judicial reticence does not always have adverse
consequences can be accepted. The Dred Scott132 decision is perhaps the
best example of a case in which the Supreme Court was presented with a
"no win" situation-no decision could forestall the upcoming civil war,
while a decision could perhaps hasten it. Similarly, Professor Fairman
presents an interesting account of the Supreme Court's avoidance of an
immediate decision in Exparte McCardle33 and observes that there were
manifest, long-term benefits to construing the post war Reconstruction
Acts as "political," since, had the Court declared the acts unconstitutional
in the spring of 1868 as it appeared it was prepared to do, there would have
been no fourteenth amendment and the recently freed slaves in America
would have achieved, through the Civil War, the eradication of the legal
badge of slavery, but not the incidents of servitude.
13 4
Nevertheless, over both the long and short-term, it is impossible to
discern how a court should respond to an institutional threatening situa-
tion. The problem is not so much deciding how to respond as it is deciding
when to respond. Truly institutional threatening situations do not arise in
isolation, solely to threaten the judicial system. It is not surprising that
both Dred Scott and Exparte McCardle arose in the period of tremendous
societal upheaval contemporaneous with the American Civil War. On the
other hand, what is perhaps viewed as an institutional threatening situa-
tion often turns out to have been inaccurately perceived, once the hoopla
130. See note 61 supra.
131. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH-THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE THE BAR OF
POLITICS 57-72 (1962). The argument posed by Bickel is critiqued in Richards, Rules, Policies and
Neutral Principles: The Search for Legitimacy in Common Law and ConstitutionalAdjudications, 11
GA. L. REv. 1069, 1087-89, 1106-10 (1977).
132. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
133. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
134. C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES-RECONSTRUCTION
AND REUNION 1864-88, 498-501 (1971).
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and notoriety surrounding the controversy has subsided.135 Finally, and
most ironically, whether the Court treats the situation as institutional
threatening and defers, as in McCardle, or proceeds, as in Dred Scott,
seems to work out in the long run, and who can say with any assurance that
had the result gone otherwise in McCardle or Dred Scott the long-term
effects would have been any different from those engendered by the actual
result or that they would have been achieved at any greater or lesser cost.
If, as I believe it is, the argument of institutional self-preservation is so
fluid as to defy reasonable containment, then it appears best to allow the
Court some leeway to find for itself the best solution to an impossible
situation. Preordaining a hard and fast rule that jurisdiction must always
be accepted will do little to aid the Court when the truly hard case is
presented.
3. The Problem of Concurrent Jurisdiction
Grants of concurrent jurisdiction force additional nuances into the
description of a proper doctrine of mandatory jurisdiction. The existence
of concurrent jurisdiction allows the same case to be simultaneously
litigated in two different forms. Does mandatory jurisdiction require
duplication of efforts? An unthinking, mechanical application of manda-
tory jurisdiction could place tremendous practical demands upon the
federal courts, demands that would reduce their decision-making effective-
ness. 136 Easy access to courts is not the sole goal of a legal system,
135. The hyperbole of the moment often seems to drown out the sense of perspective that is
essential to any informed evaluation. For example, the "Watergate crisis" that precipitated Richard
Nixon's resignation from the Presidency was often related in terms of constitutional crisis narrowly
avoided. Yet, what that crisis was has never been illuminated. The possible destruction of evidence-
the Nixon tapes-was hardly equivalent to the burning of the Reichstag. To suggest that a morally
bankrupt Presidency, faced with a hostile Congress controlled by the opposition party, posed a real
threat to the Constitution is ludicrous. The "Watergate crisis" generated much heat but about as much
light as a black hole.
136. As Judge Friendly recently observed: "A fourth consideration is Justice Jackson's never
refuted observation that '[i]t must prejudice the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a
flood of worthless ones.' The thought may be distasteful but no judge can honestly deny it is real."
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CH. L. REv. 142,
149 (1970) (footnote omitted). See also Hart, The Supreme Court 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time
Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84,94-101 (1959). The alternative of prejudicing the occasional
meritorious application may be seen as denying access for all applications, if the problem is viewed in
either-or terms. Certainly this is no help to the federal plaintiff to whom half a loaf is better than no
bread at all. The problem of burgeoning caseloads cannot, however, be dealt with so facilely. A judge
has only so much time to devote to his work. Time spent reviewing worthless applications or those that
do not immediately impact upon constitutionally or congressionally defined areas of federal concern
necessarily detracts from those cases that involve matters of compelling federal concern. It would seem
as easy to destroy the federal courts as effective institutions within our constitutional scheme by giving
them too much to do as by giving them nothing to do. One solution is simply to increase the number of
federal judges. This, however, also raises some difficulties. Again, Judge Friendly has pointed to the
problem. Writing in his recent work, H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973)
Judge Friendly observed that:
There must come a point when an increase in the number of judges makes judging, even at
the trial level, less prestigious and less attractive. Prestige is a very important factor in
attracting highly qualified men to the federal bench from much more lucrative pursuits. Yet
the largest district courts will be in the very metropolitan areas where the discrepancy between
uniform federal salaries and the financial rewards of private practice is the greatest, and the
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particularly when accentuation of one goal may prejudice the achievement
of others. On the other hand, acceptance of common-sense limitations
upon the concept of mandatory jurisdiction poses difficulties in definition.
There is probably little consensus concerning what is commonsensical and
what is not. Decisions to decline to exercise jurisdiction might be "express-
ly" grounded on common-sense reasons when, in fact, the decision to
decline jurisdiction rests upon other grounds. Of course, the possibility
that courts will not be candid cannot be protected against absolutely;
nevertheless, there is a danger in creating superficially appealing tests that,
because of their euphemistic generality, encourage judicial nondisclosure.
The test is thus to devise a rule that recognizes the values inherent in the
principle of mandatory jurisdiction, preserves the courts as effective
decision-making tribunals, and reduces the opportunities for courts to
decline to entertain controversies for improper reasons.
I have argued elsewhere that a critical analysis of the intent of the
Congress, the political body initially responsible for defining jurisdiction
grants, must be undertaken in evaluating the scope ofjurisdictional invest-
ment. 137 Hence, when Congress creates ajurisdictional scheme that allows
for access to either state or federal courts, its emphasis upon whether
certain jurisdiction statutes were designed to implement other goals would
provide meaningful guidance insofar as the question of mandatory juris-
diction was implicated. Thus:
[C]ongressional creation of concurrent jurisdiction might more profitably be
viewed as a congressional statement that uniformity in the creation and
application of federal law is less important than is making available to
American citizens the most sympathetic forum they can find to seek redress
for claimed infringements of their federal rights. In essence, creation of
concurrent jurisdiction could support a finding that Congress desired that
litigants be allowed to forum shop between state and federal courts. Such a
finding would not be illogical. Congress could certainly have intended for
federal litigation to be brought in the most sympathetic forum, and concur-
rent jurisdiction would allow forum shoppers to correct for local variations
between state and federal judiciaries. 138
Consequently, judicial recognition of the doctrine of mandatory jurisdic-
tion should occur when to do so would directly assist in the implementa-
tion of statutory objectives attendant to the creation of concurrent juris-
diction. On the other hand, when nonjurisdictional objectives would not
be furthered by recognition of the concept of mandatory jurisdiction and
difficulty of maintaining an accustomed standard of living on the federal salary the most
acute. There is real danger that in such areas, once the prestige factor was removed, lawyers
with successful practices, particularly young men, would not be willing to make the sacrifice.
Id. at 29-30 (footnote omitted). See also Leventhal, Book Review-Federal Jurisdiction: A General
View (Henry J. Friendly), 75 COLuM. L. REv. 1009 (1975) (expressing agreement with the views of
Judge Friendly regarding the antinomy of prestige and large numbers).
137. Fischer, Institutional Competence: Some Reflections on Judicial Activism in the Realm of
Forum Allocation between State and Federal Courts, 34 U. MIAMi L. REV. 175 (1980).
138. Id. at 202-03 (footnotes omitted).
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when prejudice would be occasioned, the power to decline to exercise
jurisdiction ought to be recognized, not as an inherent power of courts, but
as a necessary incident of the initial jurisdictional grant.
Mandatory jurisdiction ought not to demand that courts tolerate
concurrent adjudication in both state and federal courts in all instances. To
accept that Congress has become tolerant of forum shopping between state
and federal judiciaries does not support allowing a litigant to maintain
multiple prosecutions of a single claim.139 Once a litigant has consciously
selected a forum, the congressional policy is satisfied and one should then
focus upon a necessarily implicit part of any jurisdiction grant-the
conservation of resources when that can be accomplished at no meaningful
costs to society.
140
Thus, when a litigant files an action in both state and federal courts in
an attempt to take advantage of the earliest trial date, he can be legitimate-
ly compelled to elect between the two actions14' unless it can be said that
providing an early trial date is a congressional purpose behind the enact-
ment of the jurisdiction statute. 142 Similarly, when analysis of the jurisdic-
tion statute discloses a congressional purpose to allow judicial discretion
to decline to exercise jurisdiction, access to a federal forum can be con-
trolled.143 These exceptions retain for the federal courts the practicable
139. In the context of civil rights litigation, federal courts generally have held that a person who
has initiated litigation in state court is barred from relitigating his claim in federal court. See, e.g.,
Brown v. DeLayo, 498 F.2d 1173 (10th Cir. 1974); Roy v. Jones, 484 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1973). When
federal courts have allowed relitigation of civil rights issues, it has generally been justified by reliance
upon the substantive policies which the Civil Rights Act is designed to promote. See Lombard v. Board
of Educ., 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 976 (1975). When relitigation has been
barred, the emphasis has been placed upon the claimants' election of trial in state court as manifested
by instigation of litigation on the issues in a particular forum. See Loverly v. Laliberte, 498 F.2d 1261
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974).
140. It must be conceded that prohibitions on relitigation stand somewhat differently from bars
upon simultaneous, multiple prosecutions because the former expressly comes under a general federal
statute that adopts the doctrine of res judicata. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970) prohibitions against multiple
prosecution exist by way of ascribing to courts an inherent power to handle the repetitive and reactive
litigation in a manner best designed to serve the interests of all concerned. IA MOORE'S FEDERAL.
PRACTICE 0.203[4]. Thus, to the extent the doctrine of mandatory jurisdiction is generic, it could be
argued that federal courts have less leeway in staying multiple prosecutions than multiple relitigation
because only the latter carries an express congressional sanction against the obligation of assuming
jurisdiction. Focusing upon the congressional intent behind the formulation of jurisdictional and
substantive legislation, however, avoids inconsistency between the proper treatment for multiple
prosecution and repetitive relitigation. Thus, if the jurisdictional and substantive components of the
legislative scheme evidence the intent to allow the claimant to choose where to litigate his federal
claims, once the claimant has done so,judicial refusals to allow relitigation or multiple prosecution can
be justified as not impeding either the claimant's right to a forum or the congressional policies behind
the legislative scheme and its jurisdiction corollary.
141. Ystueta v. Parris, 486 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Reines Distributors, Inc. v. Admiral
Corp., 182 F. Supp. 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See Vestal, Repetitive Litigation, 45 IoWA L. REv. 525
(1960).
142. Although unlikely, such a congressional policy cannot be rejected out-of-hand. See note 95
supra.
143. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Adkins, 330 F.2d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1964). The Federal Declaratory
Judgments Act does not establish a new basis forjurisdiction in the federal courts; it merely establishes
a new remedy, available in cases in which jurisdiction otherwise exists. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petro-
leum Co., 1950,339 U.S. 667. . . . Moreover, the existence ofjurisdiction in an action for declaratory
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ability to function effectively and yet preserve for litigants the general
right, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, to decide for themselves whether
they wish to adjudicate their federal claims in state or federal court.
CONCLUSION
One cannot disparage the notion that myth is often as important as
law, and certainly the myth that a polity, in the context of its legal system,
is governed by law instead of men might be underscored were courts to
refuse to decide what would often be perceived as hard or difficult cases.
This point cannot be made light of. Acceptance of it produces in the end,
however, an unenviable situation-if the federal courts cannot control
their own dockets they run a real risk of becoming institutionally ineffec-
tive. 44 Certainly, this has happened to a great extent in nonconstitutional
adjudications. The return of status principles, absolute liability, and
expanding adjudicatory administrative agencies are at once a loud and
persistent cry that traditional judicial institutions are, or appear, inade-
quate. The more courts want to do, the less they seem able to accomplish or
accomplish well.
45
This whole question but bespeaks of the problem of reconciling the
irresistible force of constitutional theory with the immovable object of
political reality. The movement by the Court of such article III doctrines as
standing, ripeness, and mootness from positions of "legitimate" guardians
of the federal courthouse door to general criteria that allow for nonconsid-
eration of cases the Court does not wish to consider has been well noted.
To take standing as an example, one is at a loss to reconcile suggestions in
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,146 that pruden-
tial standing requirements constitute minimum article III demands, with
the statement in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 47 that
Congress can abolish prudential standing requirements in appropriate
situations. One would have thought Marbury v. Madison answered the
relief does not require that the court exercise it. It has ajudicial discretion to decline to grant such relief.
This has been the consistent position of the Supreme Court, the latest decision being Public Affairs As-
sociates, Inc. v. Rickover, 1960, 369 U.S. 111 .... In that case in its per curiam opinion the Court
said:
"The Declaratory Judgment Act was an authorization, not a command. It gave the federal
courts competence to make a declaration ofrights; it did not impose a duty to do so. . . .Of
course a District Court cannot decline to entertain such an action as a matter of whim or per-
sonal disinclination. 'A declaratory judgment, like other forms of equitable relief, should be
granted only as a matter of judicial discretion, exercised in the public interest.' Eccles v.
Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426, 431 [1948] ...
144. The issues of court congestion and calendar control are increasing and increasingly calling
for meaningful resolution. Of course, the first reason for these problems is the explosion of federally
recognized rights and correlative federal remedies that have arisen in the past two decades.
145. Hart, The Supreme Court 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73
HARv. L. Rav. 84 (1959).
146. 426 U.S. 26, 40-46 (1976).
147. 409 U.S. 205 (1972). The inconsistency between the two decisions is elaborated upon in
Justice Brennan's dissent in Simon. 426 U.S. 26, 58-66 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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latter proposition in the negative long ago and for all time. This but
demonstrates that the Court will find ways to avoid deciding cases it is not
prepared to decide. It would seem to be much the preferable path that in
such cases the Court be required to state why it is not prepared to take the
case at the present time, rather than to continue to indulge in these
circuitous ratiocinations that reach the only result the Court is institution-
ally prepared to make. In such cases, necessity demands that the Court be
given the discretion to make a principled decision not to decide. Now if
such a procedure casts doubt upon the supremacy of law, one must wonder
how the contrary, yet existing practices of summary affirmances, standing,
mootness, or such other devices, as presently understood and applied,
establish the primacy of law.
